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Name Calling: Identifying Stigma in the “Civil
Union”/“Marriage” Distinction
MARC R. POIRIER
The Connecticut marriage equality case, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public
Health, turns on a threshold determination that the state legislature’s distinction
between “civil union” and “marriage” creates a cognizable injury of
constitutional dimension. The court’s short explanation of its conclusion hinges
on two social facts. First, “marriage” names a long-standing, complex, and
revered social institution, while “civil union” is a new name with virtually no
history. Second, the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction is framed against a
historical background of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination against gay
men and lesbians. The court’s explanation, while accurate, is all too brief.
This Article elaborates some aspects of everyday naming practices involving
social identity and kinship, in order to assist us in understanding the injury that
comes from mandating two distinct names for the core family relationship. It
considers (1) the problem of family identity underlying Juliet’s “What’s in a
name” soliloquy in William Shakespeare’s play Romeo and Juliet; (2) Louis
Althusser’s concept of interpellation; (3) the feminist critique of language and
names, focusing in particular on the “Miss”/“Mrs.”/“Ms.” controversy; and (4)
the way in which concrete, diffuse, everyday social practices of naming and
recognition are multiscalar, and interact with larger legal and social structures
around recognition, dominance, and subordination. With these considerations in
mind, it is easier to see that the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction has a
cultural meaning that will create a stigmatic injury by reinforcing and activating
dormant, dispersed sites of stereotyping and prejudice against gay men and
lesbians. Moreover, the distinction will reinforce a preexisting sense of secondclass status, which is arguably a violation of a broad version of a guarantee of
dignity under a principle of equal protection. The “civil union”/“marriage”
distinction thus involves and facilitates name calling and identifying stigma—just
as the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded.
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Name Calling: Identifying Stigma in the “Civil
Union”/“Marriage” Distinction
MARC R. POIRIER∗
[T]he question is nicely posed: what is there in legal
marriage that is not exhausted by its legal consequences?
Whatever that “x” factor is, precisely that is what separates
legal marriage from civil union. Civil union appears to
withhold only the cultural symbol or power of marriage . . . .1
[L]aw has the potential for either impeding or
facilitating social change. Legal developments may impede
social change by serving to rationalize and validate the
perpetuation of unjust social practices. On the other hand
legal developments may reinforce ongoing social change,
providing legitimacy for that change and influencing its
future direction.2
What’s in a name?3
I. INTRODUCTION
Partway through the Connecticut marriage equality litigation, Kerrigan
v. State,4 the Connecticut legislature changed the game. By enacting An
∗
Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I am grateful to my colleagues Tristin
Green, Thomas Healy, Andrea McDowell, Michael Risinger, and Charles Sullivan for various
thoughtful conversations on this topic, and to friends John Griffin, Steve Heyl, and Peter Riley as well.
Naomi Cahn, Linda Fisher, Suzanne Kim, Lynn Wardle, and Jennifer Wriggins provided helpful
responses to inquiries. Tristin Green, Suzanne Kim, Nancy Levit, Michael Poreda, and Charles
Sullivan provided helpful comments on a draft. I thank my research assistants, Michael Poreda and
Kate Riopel, and the Seton Hall Law library staff, especially Katie McCarthy and Jeanne O’Connor, for
their agile research assistance. I also benefitted from working with Brienne Henderson on her student
note on the California marriage equality case and with Jack Tracy on his student note on the circuit
split on state criminal law regulation of sex toys. The opinions expressed herein are those of its author
and not of his employer, Seton Hall University, the Catholic university in New Jersey.
1
Katharine B. Silbaugh, The Practice of Marriage, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L. J. 189, 205 (2005).
2
Kathryn L. Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law,
1979 WIS. L. REV. 55, 63.
3
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2, line 43.
4
Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006), rev’d, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). One may choose to call the overall controversy one about
“marriage equality” or “same-sex marriage.” See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, “A Painful Process of
Waiting”: The New York, Washington, New Jersey, and Maryland Dissenting Justices Understand that
“Same-Sex Marriage” is Not What Same-Sex Couples Are Seeking, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 139, 143
(2008) (“[T]he constant use of the term ‘same-sex marriage,’ by advocates and opponents alike, seems
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Act Concerning Civil Unions (“the Civil Union Act” or “Act”),5 it
provided legal recognition and purportedly equal rights, responsibilities,
and benefits to committed same-sex couples.6 The Act introduced a new
name, “civil union,” for its new legal recognition of a same-sex couple,
and explicitly reserved the traditional name, “marriage,” for the union of
one man and one woman.7 Thus what had begun in August 20048 as a
lawsuit over Connecticut’s failure to provide any legal recognition for
same-sex couples was transmuted into a lawsuit over nomenclature. The
question became whether providing legal recognition equivalent to
traditional marriage, but recognition embedded in a new and different
name, was constitutional as a matter of state constitutional law.9
to have convinced each majority and plurality that the plaintiffs were not seeking recognition of their
fundamental right to marry, but instead were seeking a new fundamental right to ‘same-sex
marriage.’”); id. at 145–50 (section entitled “The Importance of Language in Framing the Issue for
Marriage Equality”; Marc R. Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim within the Same-Sex Marriage
Controversy, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 343, 345 n.3 (2008) [hereinafter Poirier, Cultural Property]
(discussing the terminological choice between “same-sex marriage” and “marriage equality”).
“Marriage equality” seems to be on the whole more progressive, for reasons Barbara Cox, among
others, illustrates; but all the same does not seem appropriate when describing traditionalist viewpoints
on the controversy. Moreover, “same-sex marriage” is by far the more used term at this point in time,
at least in legal academic literature. I will accordingly vary my usage in this essay according to
context.
5
An Act Concerning Civil Unions, Conn. Pub. Acts 05-10 (2005).
6
Id. § 14, codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38nn, invalidated by Kerrigan v. Comm’r of
Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (“Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits,
protections and responsibilities under law, whether derived from the general statutes, administrative
regulations or court rules, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to
spouses in a marriage, which is defined as the union of one man and one woman.”). A Connecticut
Attorney General opinion held that civil union continues to be available after Kerrigan unless and until
the legislature acts to the contrary, so the Act has not been invalidated altogether; rather, what has been
invalidated is the compulsory distinction in name between same-sex and opposite-sex couples. Conn.
Op. Ag. No. 2008-019 (2008), available at 2008 WL 4760988. Same-sex couples may choose to enter
into civil union instead of marriage after Kerrigan. However, new Connecticut legislation
implementing the Kerrigan decision amends Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-38nn to provide for merger of civil
union into marriage, voluntarily or involuntarily, on October 10, 2010. Conn. S.B. 899 § 10 (2009),
2009 Conn. Pub. Acts 13.
7
An Act Concerning Civil Unions, Conn. Pub. Acts 05-10 (2005).
8
The Kerrigan lawsuit was filed in August 2004. Kerrigan, 909 A.2d at 90.
9
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 413 (stating that the issue posed after passage of the Act is “whether the
civil union law and its prohibition against same sex marriage pass muster under the state
constitution.”). Instead of adding “civil union” and “civil union partner” systematically to many
sections of the general statutes, the Civil Union Act provided that the terms “civil union partner” and
“civil union” are to be understood as included in a number of traditional kinship terms relied on in
Connecticut’s laws.
Wherever in the general statutes the terms “spouse,” “family,” “immediate
family,” “dependent,” “next of kin” or any other term that denotes the spousal
relationship are used or defined, a party to a civil union shall be included in such use
or definition, and wherever in the general statutes [with some specified exceptions]
the term “marriage” is used or defined, a civil union shall be included in such use or
definition.
Conn. Pub. Acts 05-10, § 15, codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38oo. Nevertheless, the Act
establishes a distinct term for the relationship and for the partners in the relationship. Section 15
includes same-sex couples in various legal kinship terms only after Section 14 has separated and
distinguished them. “Civil union” is a different word from “marriage” and “part[y] to a civil union” is
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Subsequent to the Act, the Kerrigan suit called for the Connecticut courts
to consider separately the non-legal social and cultural benefits of the
institution of marriage reflected in the name “marriage,” as well as whether
the withholding of the term “marriage” in favor of a neologism, “civil
union,” somehow communicated actionable stigma about same-sex
couples.
In a relatively brief but foundational part of its opinion, the
Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding that assigning
a different name from “marriage” to legally recognized same-sex
relationships did create a cognizable constitutional injury.10 It is to this
part of the Kerrigan opinion that this Article turns its attention. Finding
constitutional injury in something as intangible as the legal adoption of a
different name is a tricky business. In fact it may plausibly seem like a
“squabble”11 of significantly lesser dimension than the conferral of tangible
benefits and responsibilities.12 This Article argues that the Connecticut
Supreme Court was correct in its holding, and that moreover it has
correctly identified the key factors that support that holding. The new and
unfamiliar legal name and status “civil union” will be interpreted against a
backdrop of, on the one hand, the widely recognized name, socially central
function, and elevated status of “marriage;” and on the other hand, the until
recently pervasive and to some extent continuing social stigmatization of
homosexuality.
This conclusion merits a more careful description. The fact that this is
a controversy about the names for a central set of social identity categories
is much of what makes the Kerrigan court’s decision on nomenclature
correct. The Act establishes and sets in motion different legal names for
the purportedly legally equivalent familial relationships.
Names,
especially names of this sort, are used repeatedly in everyday life in
various social settings. We use them to recognize and to sort. Those who
encounter a couple or even just one member of a couple must now ask, in
various contexts, “Do I say ‘marriage’ or ‘civil union’?” The imposition of
this process of categorization and naming is not limited to the members of
a same-sex couple themselves, but implicates all with whom they interact,
indeed all who interact with any couple or family. The Act thus sometimes
different from “spouse” and so on. Id. at § 14.
10
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 416–20. The two dissenting opinions also found that a constitutional
claim had been made, although for different reasons, with which the majority disagreed. Id. at 484
(Borden, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the plaintiffs had stated a constitutional claim); id. at 516
(Zarella, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the plaintiffs had stated a constitutional claim); id. at 419 n.16
(majority opinion) (responding to Justices Borden and Zarella).
11
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004) (separate opinion of
Sosman, J.).
12
See, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221 (N.J. 2006) (“[P]laintiffs’ claimed right to the
name of marriage is surely not the same now that equal rights and benefits must be conferred on
committed same-sex couples.”).
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requires, and effectively always legitimates, society-wide reliance on an
underlying gay/straight distinction, and suggests that it be applied visibly
and repeatedly in daily life. The Act thus can reactivate, and will tend to
reinforce rather than attenuate, longstanding subtle biases13 and
unconscious distinctions around gay and lesbian couples and individuals;
biases which persist even in the relatively tolerant society of Connecticut.
These biases are more likely to be expressed to some extent in various
harmful ways because of the mere process of repeatedly categorizing
individuals in couples as gay or straight. It is for these reasons that the
legally-prescribed differentiated kinship names of “marriage” and “civil
union” will produce the harm that Kerrigan correctly discerns.
The tenor of this Article is theoretical, sociological, and feminist. Its
approach may not seem of immediate use in legal pleadings and opinions,
as its categories and modes of analysis find no immediate correspondence
in the terms used in constitutional doctrine. And yet, exploring in some
detail how an iterated differential legal naming of a central social
institution can rise to the level of a constitutional injury is important as a
pragmatic, political matter, as well as a theoretical and academic one.14 In
states that are generally welcoming to LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transsexual, and Queer) folk,15 as individuals and as couples with their
families, the question of differential naming of same-sex relationships is
front and center. In two of the states that have adopted “civil union” for
same-sex couples, Vermont and New Jersey, state commissions have
recently found that the term does not deliver the equality required by those
states’ highest courts’ interpretations of their state constitutions.16 In April,
13

The term “subtle bias” is tricky, as it can be used in various, not altogether consistent ways. I
have previously used it broadly to indicate various processes of discrimination that do not involve
“invidious intent”. Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL. J. 459, 467 (2003) [hereinafter Poirier, Cognitive Bias]
(discussing “subtle bias”); see generally Symposium, Combating Subtle Discrimination in the
Workplace, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529 (2003) (presenting various articles that use “subtle
discrimination” in various ways).
14
For an excellent argument that the task of legal academics differs from that of practitioners or
advocates and yet, in its learned distance from the controversy at hand, may ultimately contribute
importantly to understanding and progress, see Robert Leckey, Thick Instrumentalism and
Comparative Constitutionalism: The Case of Gay Rights, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 425, 465–74
(2009). Leckey specifically argues that in the case of gay rights Kulturkampf issues, one role of the
scholar is to elucidate the cultural and social underpinnings that inform any struggle around gender
practices that is framed in constitutional terms, terms which may well be too thin adequately to account
for the underlying issues at stake. Id. That is exactly the approach taken in this Article.
15
I will tend to use this formulation (or alternatively GLBTQ) unless another is historically
accurate (as for example when referring to a period when the terms bisexuals and transsexuals were not
spoken, or when describing someone else’s position that is articulated in different terms). The
nominalization currently still seems to be “homosexuality.”
16
NEW JERSEY CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMMISSION, THE LEGAL, MEDICAL, ECONOMIC & SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF NEW JERSEY’S CIVIL UNION LAW 2 (Dec. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcr/downloads/CURC-Final-Report-.pdf [hereinafter NEW JERSEY FINAL
REPORT]. THE OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE VERMONT COMMISSION ON FAMILY
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2009, Vermont legislatively enacted a law recognizing “marriage” by
same-sex couples.17 The New Jersey Final Report18 lays the groundwork
for introduction of a “marriage” bill, probably this year,19 and may lead to
a renewed state constitutional lawsuit in that state if the anticipated
legislation fails.20 In addition to Vermont, so far in 2009 Connecticut has
enacted legislation conforming to the Kerrigan decision, Maine has
replaced its partial recognition “domestic partnership” statute with a
“marriage” statute, and New Hampshire has replaced its 2008 full “civil
union” status with “marriage” recognition.21 Legislative efforts in several
other states are also underway or are planned.22 Then there is California,
RECOGNITION AND PROTECTION 26–27 (2008), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/WorkGroups/
FamilyCommission/VCFRP_Report.pdf [hereinafter VERMONT 2008 REPORT].
17
Vt. S.B. 115, 2009 Vt. Laws 3 (Apr. 7, 2009) (overriding gubernatorial veto) (effective Sept. 1,
2009) (entitled “An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and Promote Equality in Civil Marriage”); see
Terri Hallenbeck, Same-Sex Couples Gain Full Marriage, THE BURLINGTON (VERMONT) FREE PRESS,
Apr. 8, 2009, at A1.
18
Supra note 16.
19
See, e.g., George Amick, Jersey Should Follow Vt. Lead, THE TIMES OF TRENTON (N.J.), Apr.
13, 2009 (discussing prospects for enactment of a New Jersey marriage equality bill in late 2009); Mary
Fuchs, N.J. Gay Rights Advocates; Marriage Near, (NEWARK) STAR-LEDGER, May 7, 2009, at 27
(describe expectations of New Jersey marriage equality advocates); Claire Heininger, Gay Marriage
Could Become a Big Campaign Issue Next Year, (NEWARK) STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 11, 2008, at 27
(describing plans for marriage equality legislation in New Jersey in 2009, as well as anticipated
opposition to it).
20
The theory would be that Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006), establishes a state
constitutional requirement of equality and that the NEW JERSEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, provides
strong evidence that this equality is simply not attainable through legal recognition via civil union. See,
e.g., Leslie Brody & John Reitmeyer, Same-Sex Marriage Fight Heats Up in N.J.; Decisions in Iowa,
Vermont Spark Intense Debate, THE BERGEN (BERGEN COUNTY, N.J.) RECORD, Apr. 9, 2009 (quoting
State Senator Ray Lesniak saying that if the legislature does not act to allow marriage for same-sex
couples the state supreme court will); David S. Buckel, Lewis v. Harris: Essay on a Settled Question
and an Open Question, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 221, 226 (2007) (arguing that the constitutionality of the
New Jersey civil union bill “is open to be settled by the judiciary”). Mr. Buckel argued Lewis v. Harris
on behalf of plaintiffs.
21
Conn. S.B. 899 (2009), 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts 13; Maine L.D. 1020, 2009 Me. Laws 82 (2009);
N.H. H.B. No. 436 (2009), 2009 N.H. ch. 59; see Abby Goodnough, New Hampshire Approves SameSex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009, at A19; Abby Goodnough, Maine Governor Signs Same-Sex
Marriage Bill as Opponents Plan a ‘Veto’, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2000, at A21; Eric Moskowitz, N.H.
Ties Gay-Marriage Knot: Revised Bill Assures Religious Protections, Boston Globe, June 4, 2009, at
Metro Section, p. 1; Philip Shishkin, Maine Becomes Fifth State to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage, WALL
ST. J., May 7, 2009, at A4.
22
Marriage equality bills are pending or contemplated in the District of Columbia, Illinois,
Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington State. Minn. H.F. No.
893, H.F. No. 1644, S.F. No. 120, S.F. No. 1210 (2009); N.Y. A.B. No. 7732, S.B. No. 4401 (2009);
see Tom Barnes, Senator Pushes Bill to Allow Same-Sex Marriage, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May
28, 2009 (describing a marriage equality bill introduced in the Pennsylvania Senate); Tim Craig, Group
Aims to Block D.C. Marriage Bill: Same-Sex Union Foes Seek Referendum, WASH. POST, May 28,
2009 (describing plans for a District of Columbia marriage equality bill and plans by opponents for a
preemptive referendum); Abby Goodnough, A Push Is On for Same-Sex Marriage Rights Across New
England, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2009, at 13 (listing six states with pending measures not expected to pass
this year; presumably the author omits New Jersey because chances there for passage in 2009 are
better); Jeremy W. Peters, Gay Marriage Slow to Draw an Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2009, at
A1 (describing politics surrounding pending New York marriage equality bill); Jeremy W. Peters,
Assembly Passes Gay Marriage Bill: Senate Fight Awaits, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2009, at A24; Nikita
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Stewart, Gay Marriage Fuels Debate Among D.C. Democrats, WASH. POST, May 21, 2009, at DZ1
(District Councilmember David Catania plans to introduce marriage equality legislation in 2009); Amy
Worden, Pa. Senate to Weigh Contrasting Measures on Gay Marriage, Phila. Inquirer, June 4, 2009, at
B1 (a marriage equality bill has been introduced in the state Senate, and a mini-DOMA will be
introduced). Rhode Island will entertain marriage equality legislation in 2011. Goodnough, supra.
Some states are facing or have recently faced legislation proposing to recognize same-sex couples
legally under another name. Hawaii H.B. No. 444, S.B. No. 457 (2009) (proposing civil union
equivalent of marriage); Illinois H.B. 2234 (2009) (proposing civil union equivalent of marriage);
Minn. H.F. No. 999 (2009) (proposing civil union equivalent of marriage); N.M. H.B. No. 21, S.B. No
12 (2009) (proposing domestic partnership equivalent of marriage); Wash. S.B. No. 5688, 2009 Wash.
ch. 521 (2009) (enacting domestic partnership equivalent of marriage); see Hawaii: Measure on Civil
Union Dies in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, at A20; Lornet Turnbull, Gregoire Expands SameSex Partnerships, SEATTLE TIMES, May 18, 2009, available at
http://seattletimes.
nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009233610_webdomestic18.html (describing signing of new full
domestic partnership law, despite opposition). Nevada should also be mentioned in this catalog of
approaches to state recognition. It recently adopted a “domestic partnership” statute that recognizes
same-sex couples, conferring almost all the benefits and responsibilities of marriage, but not requiring
employer payment of health benefits to domestic partners. 2009 NV S.B. 283, 2009 Nev. ch. 393; see
Steve Friess, Nevada Partnership Bill Now Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at A12; Ed Vogel & Molly
Ball, Domestic Partnerships to be Law in Nevada, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, June 1, 2009, at A1.
Nevada’s “domestic partnership” is emphatically not the legal equivalent of marriage, because that
would violate a state constitutional mini-DOMA. Editorial, Domestic Partners, LAS VEGAS REVIEWJOURNAL, at B9 (discussing difference between Nevada “domestic partnership” law and recognition
that would be prohibited under Nevada’s mini-DOMA); Vogel & Ball, supra (same)).
Recognition of same-sex marriages valid elsewhere is another approach a jurisdiction may adopt,
on its own merits, or as a stepping stone towards marriage equality via that jurisdiction’s own laws.
The District of Columbia Council has just voted overwhelmingly to recognize same-sex marriages
performed in other states. D.C. Leg. Bill No. 10 (2009) (proposing to add 28 U.S.C. § 1287a, to
recognize a marriage between a same-sex couple valid in another jurisdiction); see Tim Craig, D.C.
Gay Marriage Measure Set for Mayor’s Signature, WASH. POST, May 5, 2009. But cf. Hamill R.
Harris, U.S. House Members File Bill to Overturn Action by D.C. Council, WASH. POST, May 22, 2009,
at B8 (members of the United States House of Representatives have introduced a bill to define marriage
in the District of Columbia as between one man and one woman, in order to defeat the bill originating
in the District that would recognize out-of-jurisdiction marriages). A similar out-of-state marriage
recognition approach may occur in Maryland. Editorial, Rethinking Marriage, BALT. SUN, May 10,
2009, at A24 (recommending recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages as a bridge to marriage
equality in Maryland); Laura Smitherman, State Studies Gay Nuptuals; Gansler Explores Recognition
of Marriages in Other States, BALT. SUN, May 30, 2009, at A1 (state attorney general is exploring the
legality of recognition of out-of-state marriages in light of state statutory definition of marriage as one
man and one woman). Maryland currently has partial recognition of a smallish set of domestic partner
rights and obligations. See Smitherman, supra. New York currently recognizes out-of-state marriages
by same-sex couples, though this approach, adopted by the governor, county executives, and lower
courts, is currently before the state’s highest court. Lewis v. New York Dept. of Civil Service, 872
N.Y.S. 2d 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 2009), leave to appeal granted, -- N.E.2d --, 2009 WL 971444
(N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) (upholding recognition of valid out-of-state same-sex marriages of state
employees under New York’s marriage recognition rule, and as a valid exercise of executive authority);
Godfrey v. Spano, 871 N.Y.S. 2d 296 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 2008), leave to appeal granted, -N.E.2d --, 2009 WL 936963 (N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009) (upholding Westchester County executive order
requiring recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages, as a valid exercise of executive authority and
as a valid application of New York’s marriage recognition rule); Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850
N.Y.S. 2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dept. 2008), leave to appeal dismissed, 889 N.E.2d 496 (N.Y.
2008) (applying New York marriage recognition rule to valid out-of-state same-sex marriages);
Golden v. Paterson, 877 N.Y.S. 2d 822 (N.Y. Sup. 2008) (upholding Governor Paterson’s May 14,
2008, Executive Order requiring governmental agencies to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages,
as a valid exercise of executive authority and as a valid application of New York’s marriage
recognition rule); C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S. 2d 884 (N.Y. Sup. 2008) (recognizing a Massachusetts
same-sex marriage for purposes of divorce in New York); Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S. 2d 501
(N.Y. Sup. 2008) (recognizing a Canadian same-sex marriage for purposes of divorce in New York).
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where a constitutional holding requiring the legal recognition of same-sex
couples through “marriage” rather than “domestic partnership” was
reversed by an initiative, Proposition 8, which has recently survived a state
constitutional challenge and is now the subject of a federal constitutional
challenge; meanwhile the “domestic partnership” regime prevails, except
as to 18,000 California same-sex “marriages,” which are valid as
“marriages” because they were celebrated between the June 2008 effective
date of the California Supreme Court decision and the November 2008
initiative.23 Last but not least, President Obama’s agenda for LGBT civil
In a blog posting describing the current marriage equality strategy, Matt Coles, Director of the
ACLU Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender & AIDS project, describes a focus on legislative action in
eleven states. Matt Coles, Iowa and Vermont: The Politics of It, Apr. 10, 2009, available at
http://blog.aclu.org/2009/04/10/iowa-and-vermont-the-politics-of-it/; see also Goodnough (Apr. 5),
supra, at 13 (describing momentum for marriage equality in New England in light of April 3, 2009,
Iowa Supreme Court decision and then-pending Vermont legislative action). Circumstances are
changing so fast that parts of this post are already out of date.
Same-sex relationship recognition legislation is always controversial and rarely a sure thing. See,
e.g., Marc Fisher, Opinions Vary on Same-Sex Marriage in D.C., WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2009
(suburban edition) (describing action by District of Columbia council to recognize same-sex marriages
valid elsewhere and discussing the politics of legalization of same-sex marriage in the District of
Columbia); Tim Craig, D.C. Pledges Quick Review on Marriage Referendum, WASH. POST, May 29,
2009, at B1 (discussing review of proposed popular referendum on District of Columbia recognition of
out-of-jurisdiction marriage, in light of limitation on referenda undermining the District’s Human
Rights Act); Goodnough (May 7), supra note 21 (opponents of Maine marriage statute plan to attempt
a constitutional amendment); Chris Grygiel, Foes Challenge Expanded Same-Sex Partner Rights,
POST-INTELLIGENCER,
May
4,
2009,
available
at
http://www.seattlepi.
SEATTLE
com/local/405838_domestic04.html?source=rss (describing a petition drive to repeal by referendum
Washington State’s new all-but-in-name domestic partnership recognition of same-sex relationships);
Harris, supra (describing bill in Congress that would reverse District of Columbia recognition of outof-jurisdiction same-sex marriages); Heininger, supra note 19 (describing political controversy over the
anticipated marriage equality legislation in New Jersey); Rex W. Huppke & Monique Garcia, Illinois
Gays Not Betting on Marriage: State’s Political Realities Steer Gays to Push for Civil Unions,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 14, 2009; Adam Nagourney, Same-Sex Marriage Holds Peril for G.O.P.,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at A15 (discussing internal disagreement within the Republican party over
the importance to voters of the same-sex marriage issue); Adam Nagourney, Signs G.O.P. Is Rethinking
Stance on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at A4; Jeremy W. Peters, Group Begins Ad Blitz
Against Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at A22 (describing planned ad blitz in New
York by the National Organization for Marriage); Peters (May 20), supra (describing marriage politics
in New York); Peters (May 13), supra (same); Jeremy W. Peters, Advocates on Both Sides Seek
Momentum on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009 (assessing prospects for marriage
equality legislation in New York and New Jersey); Shishkin, supra note 21 (describing anticipated
attempt to amend Maine constitution in reaction to its new marriage equality statute); Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Gay Issues in View, Obama is Pressed to Engage, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A1; Turnbull,
supra (describing plans for referendum in Washington State to overturn new full domestic partnership
law); Karl Vick, “The Mormons Are Coming”: Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage Trumpet the
Church’s Work Against It, WASH. POST, May 29, 2009, at A3 (discussing political strategy around
visibility of Mormon and Catholic opposition to marriage equality); Worden, supra (describing conflict
in Pennsylvania Senate). Positions on same-sex marriage will also likely be a litmus test in upcoming
judicial confirmation hearings, including Supreme Court nominations. See Shailagh Murray, GayMarriage Issue Awaits Court Pick: Same-Sex Unions Supplant Abortion As Social Priority for
Conservatives, WASH. POST, May 17, 2009, at A1.
23
Domestic Partner Rights & Responsibilities Act, 2003 Cal. Stat. 2586 (ch. 421), held
unconstitutional, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), rev’d by referendum, Proposition 8,
Nov. 2008, aff’d as to prospective effect, Strauss v. Horton, -- P.3d --, 2009 WL 1444594 (Cal. 2009)
(affirming constitutionality of Proposition 8, but holding that the approximately 18,000 California
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rights expressly includes achieving legal recognition for same-sex equality
through “civil union,”24 but does not include “marriage.”25 A better
understanding of how the differentiation of legal names for couples
relationships delivers an ongoing cognizable harm will be helpful to the
cause of marriage equality in all these arenas.
This Article scrutinizes the two key issues articulated by the Kerrigan
majority opinion as creating the cognizable though intangible harm. First
is differential recognition, in which an honored and central name, status,
and identity (“marriage”) is withheld from one group while it is retained
for another. Second is the fact that the new name (“civil union”) is applied
to a group (same-sex couples, as a proxy for gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals) that has suffered a long history of stigma and subordination and
as such, the new term will be read and acted on in light of that history.
The Kerrigan majority does not particularly acknowledge another
intangible harm—the ongoing, repeated social non-recognition that comes
from applying a brand-new name, “civil union,” to legal same-sex family
relationships. The facts are clear that the name “civil union” for same-sex
couples and their families is often not recognized or understood, both in
marriages between same-sex couples that occurred between June and November, 2008, remain valid
and recognized in California), federal challenge to Proposition 8 filed, Perry v. Schwarzenegger (N.D.
Cal. May 22, 2009) (No. CV 09 2292) (challenging Proposition 8 as a matter of Due Process and Equal
Protection, and also seeking a declaratory judgment that sections of the California Family Code
declaring marriage to be between one man and one woman are unconstitutional); see, e.g., Matt Coles,
Prop 8: Let’s Not Make The Same Mistake Next Time, available at http://gbge.
aclu.org/content/view/604/76/ (analyzing the LGBTQ loss in Proposition 8 referendum); Geoffrey A.
Fowler, Gay-Rights Outreach Grows in California, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2009, at A4 (describing plans
of California marriage equality advocacy groups in light of anticipated defeat in the California Supreme
Court on challenge to constitutionality of Proposition 8); Andrew Harmon & Neal Broverman, Legal
Experts Concerned by Fed. Prop. 8 Case, ADVOCATE.COM, May 27, 2009, available at
http://www.advocate.com/print_article_ektid86574.asp (describing opposition of LGBT leadership
groups to federal court Proposition 8 lawsuit); Jesse McKinley & Rebecca Cathcart, Bush v. Gore Foes
Join to Fight California Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at A1 (describing federal
lawsuit challenging Proposition 8 and dismay of LGBT advocacy groups at this departure from their
preferred strategy of avoiding federal courts for the time being on the issue of marriage equality); Jesse
McKinley, Proposition’s Opponents Say Fight Will Continue, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009 (describing
LGB T advocacy groups’ plans for another referendum on “marriage” in California, in light of Strauss
v. Horton); John Schwarz et al., Ruling Upholds California’s Ban on Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2009, at A1 (describing Strauss v. Horton and reaction to it); John Schwarz & Jesse McKinley,
Court Weighs Voters’ Will Against Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009, at A12 (describing oral
arguments in Proposition 8 challenge litigation).
24
The White House’s statement of the Civil Rights Agenda of President Barack Obama,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/civil_rights/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2009) (“Obama supports full
civil unions that give same-sex couples legal rights and privileges equal to those of married couples.”);
BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 222–23 (2006) (voicing support for legal recognition of
same-sex couples via “civil union”).
25
In fact, then candidate Obama wrote that he believes for religious reasons that marriage is
between one man and one woman. OBAMA, supra note 24, at 222–24 (stating candidate Obama’s
religion-based opposition to recognizing same-sex couples legally through marriage, but also
expressing his openness to continuing revelation on the issue); see also Stolberg, supra note 22
(describing President Obama’s political dilemma on a number of LGBTQ issues, including relationship
recognition).
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everyday social interactions and, occasionally, in some service
transactions,26 such as emergency room visits, where much more is at
stake. This risk of social non-recognition creates a constant annoyance,
additional identity work,27 both in claiming recently-conferred legal rights
and in establishing kinship identity to strangers, and it can risk great losses
in emergencies where services are withheld because of non-recognition.
So the mere unfamiliarity of the term “civil union” to the world at large is
another plausible source of principally intangible injury. Social nonrecognition is not however an injury that I will focus on here.28
There is of course another significant type of non-recognition injury,
deriving from the refusal of various legal jurisdictions to recognize “civil
union” or similar marriage substitutes even though they are legal in the
state in which they were celebrated.29 Whether such states would
recognize a “marriage” of a same-sex couple as valid under the principle of
lex loci celebrationis when they would not recognize a “civil union,” or
whether on the contrary their public policy would prohibit that kind of
recognition also,30 is an important question. To be sure, this kind of legal
non-recognition harm, though tangible, may not be attributable to policies
of the state of Connecticut at all, but rather to policies of other states when
faced with a demand for recognition of a Connecticut “civil union.”31
The Article also does not engage the question whether, assuming there
is cognizable harm, it is of such dimension that the court should remedy it
posthaste. This is the issue that Kris Franklin has deftly identified as the
“authoritative moment”—when a court, faced with a question involving
recognition, has to decide the boundary of its authority to interpret queer
26

The term comes from Erving Goffman, The Interaction Order, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 14 (1983).
The term comes from Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1259, 1262 (2000).
28
I hope to explore the mostly intangible injuries from social non-recognition of civil unions
separately, as part of an article in progress on information costs, identity claiming work, and kinship
forms, tentatively entitled Identity Claiming Work, the Standardization of Kinship Forms, and the
“Civil Union” / “Marriage” Distinction .
29
The problem of interstate recognition of same-sex marriages has created a vigorous scholarly
discussion. See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX
MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES (2006); Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the
Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433 (2005); Joanna L. Grossman, Fear and
Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriages and Some Lessons from the History of Marriage and
Divorce, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 87, 105–12 (2004); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of
Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997); Tobias
Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215
(2005). Thanks to Joanna Grossman for insisting on this point.
30
As for example with the federal Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. §1738C (2009), and most
states’ mini-DOMAs, depending on how they are applied to out-of-state same-sex marriages and
marriage substitutes.
31
Indeed, in the trial court opinion in Kerrigan, Judge Pittman acknowledged that this kind of
recognition problem might create a real injury, but he held that it was not caused by the Civil Union
Act but by other jurisdictions’ recognition policies. Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89, 101 (Conn. Super.
2006).
27

1436

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1425

32

families. To some extent this question can be construed as a question of
choice of remedy.33 Case law and secondary authorities differ on whether
and when it is permissible for a court to defer imposing a constitutional
remedy in order to permit the legislature to act.34 This issue is also beyond
the scope of this Article.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides some background on
the emergence of the term “civil union” and sets out the Kerrigan analysis
of the claim of constitutional harm from legislating a different name for
legal same-sex relationships. Part III discusses family names and kinship
32
Kris Franklin, The “Authoritative Moment”: Exploring the Boundaries of Interpretation in the
Recognition of Queer Families, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 655, 659 (2006).
33
This is how Vermont Chief Justice Amestoy characterized the issue. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d
864, 886–88 (Vt. 1999) (discussing leaving the choice of the name used for legal recognition in terms
of remedy); id. at 888 (specifically citing Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARV. L. REV. 4, 101 (1996)); see also DAVID MOATS, CIVIL WARS: A BATTLE FOR GAY MARRIAGE
138–44 (2004) (describing the disagreement between Chief Justice Amestoy and Justice Johnson in
Baker v. State in terms of remedy); Robert F. Williams, Old Constitutions and New Issues: National
Lessons from Vermont’s State Constitutional Case on Marriage of Same-Sex Couples, 43 B.C. L. REV.
73, 99–104 (2001) (discussing the disagreement between Chief Justice Amestoy and Justice Johnson as
to remedy in terms of concern for state constitutional processes).
34
Compare, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886–88 (Vt. 1999) (permissible for court to defer
remedy to allow legislature to consider alternatives) and Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221–24 (N.J.
2006) (same), with Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 897–904 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (not permissible for
court to defer remedy) and Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d at 230–31 (Poritz, C.J., concurring and
dissenting) (same); see Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Foreword: State Constitutional Law Lecture: Pragmatic
Constitutionalism—Reflections on State Constitutional Theory and Same-Sex Marriage Claims, 35
RUTGERS L.J. 1249, 1249–51, 1255–56, 1259–60 (2004) (situating Baker v. State within a theory of
“pragmatic constitutionalism” which recognizes that other, nonjudicial actors within a state also play a
role in determining constitutional principles, and suggesting that a court deferring remedy as a matter
of “constitutional strategy” may be especially appropriate in state constitutional cases); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS150–53 (2002)
[hereinafter ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE] (arguing that judicial deferral of remedies for rights, such
as occurred in Baker v. State, is sometimes justified as a short- to medium-term strategy for achieving
longer term liberal equality goals); Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of
Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 15, 36 (2000) [hereinafter Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions] (arguing that
“[b]y bringing the legislature into the act, the Court [in Baker v. State] acted not so much as the dictator
of a result, but as a catalyst for change”); Gil Kujovich, An Essay on the Passive Virtue of Baker v.
State, 25 VT. L. REV. 93, 97 (2000) (assessing Baker v. State in light of the passive virtues of the
judiciary advocated by Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961) and the decisional minimalism advocated by Cass Sunstein, The
Supreme Court 1995 Term, Foreword, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996)); Mae
Kuykendall, Gay Marriages and Civil Unions: Democracy, The Judiciary and Discursive Space in
Liberal Society, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1003, 1011–16 (2001) [hereinafter Kuykendall, Gay Marriages]
(arguing that litigation over recognition of same-sex couples forces courts to employ a new vocabulary
for family relationships, which in turn will shape the political and cultural discourse that will ultimately
resolve recognition claims and nomenclature issues); Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism:
Toward a Theory of State Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 874–76 (1999) (arguing that
interpretation of state constitutions is far less text-centered than interpretation of the federal
constitution, because of the interplay between judicial interpretation and political mobilization, and
using state constitutional politics around gay rights and same-sex marriage recognition in Hawaii and
Oregon as case studies); Williams, supra note 33, at 101–04 (identifying within the approach of Baker
v. State strategic elements aimed at agenda setting and a legislative remedy); Kara M.L. Young,
Comment, Prudent Use of Judicial Minimalism: Why Minimalism May Not Be Appropriate in the
Context of Same-Sex Marriage, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 501 (2005) (arguing that judicial minimalism is
not appropriate in certain contexts, and that the marriage equality controversy is one of them).
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names and categories. It provides several perspectives on why names for
core kinship categories are so important, how they work, how they can
recognize and foster changes in social structure, or on the contrary,
stabilize social structures, standardize kinship forms and slow change. One
conclusion ultimately drawn here is that kinship category names, trivial as
they may seem, have a considerable force and influence in everyday life,
much like other kinds of names that have been the subject of scrutiny in
recent decades.
Marriage-marking honorifics for women
(“Miss”/“Mrs.”/“Ms.”) will be the point of comparison, though gender
markers on occupations, the role of gendered given names, the changing of
surnames upon marriage, the conferral of paternal names on children, and
so on would all be relevant. All I seek to do here is to open up the
understanding of why names such as “civil union”/“marriage” are so
important, and perhaps suggest that several decades of feminist argument
challenging unexamined naming practices would be more than a little
relevant.
Part IV re-engages the two social facts that led the Kerrigan majority
to find a cognizable harm at stake. The neologism “civil union” is likely to
be read against a background of a long historical practice of stigmatizing
gay men and lesbians, both singly and as couples. This stigma bleeds
through the supposed neutrality of the new name “civil union.” In part this
is for no other reason than because it is new and has no history of its own.
Just as important, though, is the recognition that to deploy “civil union”
and “marriage” properly requires everyone involved in interactions where
these names are to be used to identify the couple as same- or different-sex.
The mere fact of imposing a nomenclature distinction is problematic. Not
only does the “civil union” distinction force partners in same-sex couples
to come out as probably gay, lesbian, or bisexual over and over again,
including in their interactions with strangers; but as a practical matter in
daily life, the provision in the law for two different categories requires
everyone involved in interactions with same-sex couples to affirmatively
identify them over and over again as a same-sex couple, therefore probably
gay, lesbian, or bisexual. The law’s provision of a separate name serves to
perpetuate microperformances and microidentifications of a historically
stigmatized category. It thus contributes to the likelihood that individually
held cognitive stereotypes and prejudices will persist and be deployed.
Reminding everyone that the couple is gay or lesbian will trigger
stereotypical associations and consequent behaviors.35
Part IV also briefly considers the argument that the reservation of the
traditional term “marriage” for different-sex couples creates a stigmatic
injury by elevating different-sex couples and thus implicitly excluding
35
See Thomas Healy, Stigmatic Harm and Standing, 92 IOWA L. REV. 417, 450–58 (2007)
(discussing the mechanism of stigmatic injury).
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same-sex couples from an intangible but important recognition by the state.
I view this as a different though related type of injury from implied stigma.
Using the framework of Kenneth Karst’s arguments about equal
citizenship,36 one can identify a type of stigmatic harm that involves the
state elevating one group and thereby symbolically subordinating other
groups.37 An example that comes to mind involves some kinds of legal
recognition of religion. Karst understands that one problem with
government endorsement of one religion is that it implicitly assigns
adherents of other religions to a second-class status.38 This argument
captures something important about the “civil union”/“marriage”
distinction as well. Even if not intended to be stigmatizing or demeaning,
the naming distinction will be understood to acknowledge special and not
so special citizens. In an arena as important as marriage and family,
perhaps this should not be permitted.
Part V is a recapitulation, tying together the threads in my argument
about how the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction necessarily amounts to
name calling and identifying stigma.
I follow here Greg Johnson’s recommendation to refer to “civil union”
in the singular when discussing it as an institution,39 just as we refer to
“marriage” in the singular when discussing the institution of marriage.
Even if “civil union” turns out to come up short as an alternative to
“marriage” for same-sex couples, we should avoid subtly slanting our
discussion by treating “civil union” as no more than a collection of
individual relationships that are undeserving of a name collectively as an
alternative family institution.40
This Article was drafted during the winter and spring of 2009, a period
in which legal and political developments around the legal recognition of
same-sex couples unfolded in the United States as rapidly as they ever
have. Its background discussion is current as of June 10, 2009.

36
See generally KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1989) [hereinafter KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA]; Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme
Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1977) [hereinafter Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship].
37
See Healy, supra note 35, at 436–38 (noting how nonadherents of the government-endorsed
religion are cast as “second-class citizens”); Kenneth L. Karst, Justice O’Connor and the Substance of
Equal Citizenship, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 371 [hereinafter Karst, Justice O’Connor]
(“[G]overnment’s message of exclusion is itself a stigmatic harm, and an unconstitutional denial of full
membership in the community.”).
38
See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of
Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 512 (1992) [hereinafter Karst, The First Amendment]
(explaining that legal recognition of a particular religion inherently classifies followers of that religion
as “insiders” and nonfollowers as “outsiders”).
39
Greg Johnson, Civil Union, A Reappraisal, 30 VT. L. REV. 891, 906 (2006) [hereinafter
Johnson, Reappraisal].
40
Id.
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II. THE BACKGROUND OF “CIVIL UNION” AND THE KERRIGAN ANALYSIS
OF THE CLAIM OF CONSTITUTIONALLY COGNIZABLE INJURY
A. The Background of “Civil Union”
It might seem straightforward to begin by asking, “Where does ‘civil
union’ come from?” The answer at face value would be Vermont.41
But first let us take an important detour. Where does marriage come
from? At once a more complex vista opens up. Individual marriages are
individual choices, at least in one sense—sometimes marriages are
prompted by families, inter-couple bargains or exigencies, or other
circumstances. Marriage, however, is defined and regulated by the state,
so there is a legal component, and as well a myriad of social expectations,
sometimes themselves fixed in religious or cultural norms, sometimes
more fluid. Some persons of faith would go further, arguing (however
inaccurately as a historical matter) that marriage is and always has been
one way or another—relevantly to us, between one man and one woman—
that it is ordained by God, that it is a sacrament, and so on. Without
exploring all these avenues here, suffice it to say that marriage is rich,
deep, and long as an institution, in our culture and in our history. It comes
from and goes to a lot of places.
Now the question “Where does civil union come from?” and the
response “It comes from Vermont” seem impoverished, almost pathetic.
And I think in fact that may be a good part of the point.
The term “civil union” was created by the Vermont legislature in
response to the space left open by the marriage equality suit in Vermont,
Baker v. State.42 That case focused on “[t]he legal benefits and protections
flowing from a marriage license,”43 and expressly reserved for another day
the question of whether “notwithstanding equal benefits and protections . .
. the denial of a marriage license operates per se to deny constitutionally
protected rights.”44 As to remedy, the Baker majority left it up to the
legislature to decide whether to revise the state’s statutes to include samesex couples as married, or to provide some other institution that would
afford same-sex couples the same legal benefits, as required by that state’s

41

See, e.g., David S. Buckel, Government Affixes a Label of Inferiority on Same-Sex Couples
When It Imposes Civil Unions and Denies Access to Marriage, 16 STAN. L. & POL. REV. 73, 75 (2005)
(“In America, the concept of civil unions first took form in Vermont . . . .”). The term “civil union”
originated in France. Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions, supra note 34, at 44.
42
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
43
Id. at 884. In fact the majority opinion recited a large catalog of the principal legal benefits.
See id. at 883–84 (listing the many benefits and protections granted to persons holding a Vermont
marriage license). It simply did not address intangible cultural and social consequences that flow from
married status.
44
Id. at 886.
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46

constitution. Justice Johnson dissented. Rather than give the legislature
the leeway granted by the majority, Justice Johnson would have issued the
requested injunction in order or provide an immediate remedy to the
violation of the plaintiffs’ civil rights.47 She noted the issue of whether a
separate institution with a different name conferring the same benefits
would create an inferior status; but in view of her preferred remedy—
marriage for same-sex couples, and right away—she expressly did not
discuss the issue in detail.48 The Vermont legislature in response, after a
contentious debate, determined not to redefine marriage but to confer the
constitutionally required rights, benefits, and responsibilities in a form with
a new name—“civil union.”49
Other terms for “marriage substitutes” for the legal recognition of
same-sex couples had already surfaced, though their legal content was
impoverished. Municipalities began to recognize “domestic partnerships”
legally in the 1980s.50 The term was also adopted in contractual parlance
for human relations policies of private corporations, universities, and other
employers. Some states eventually adopted partial “domestic partnership”
recognition, and in the years subsequent to the Vermont legislature’s action
in 2000, some of those states used “domestic partnership” for a status
practically equivalent to marriage.51 But the term “domestic partnership”

45
Id. at 886–87. It noted the examples of “domestic partnership” and of some foreign
jurisdictions’ “registered partnership.” Id. It did not include the term “civil union,” which had not yet
been used.
46
Id. at 897–904 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Johnson also
offered an analysis of the issue presented as a straightforward matter of sex discrimination. Id. at 904–
12.
47
Id. at 898.
48
Id. at 899 n.2.
49
See generally ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 43–82 (describing the
Vermont litigation and subsequent Vermont legislative deliberation); MOATS, supra note 33, at 142–44
(describing the Vermont legislature’s deliberations); Michael Mello, For Today I’m Gay: The
Unfinished Battle for Same-Sex Marriage in Vermont, 25 VT. L. REV. 149, 166–242 (2000) (describing
the Vermont legislature’s deliberations).
50
See ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 12–15 (summarizing the early history of
domestic partnership ordinances); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY,
GENDER, AND THE LAW 1049 (2d ed. 2004) (same).
51
Domestic Partner Rights & Responsibilities Act, 2003 Cal. Stat. 2586 (ch. 421), held
unconstitutional, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), rev’d by referendum, Proposition 8,
Nov. 2008, Proposition 8 aff’d as to prospective application, Strauss v. Horton, -- P.3d --, 2009 WL
1444594 (Cal. 2009), federal challenge to Proposition 8 filed, Perry v. Schwarzenegger (N.D. Cal. May
22, 2009) (No. CV 09 2292) (challenging Proposition 8 as a matter of Due Process, Equal Protection,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and also seeking a declaratory judgment that sections of the California Family
code declaring marriage to be between one man and one woman are unconstitutional); 2007 Or. Laws
ch. 99. Washington State has had a more piecemeal version of “domestic partnership,” and only
recently adopted a “domestic partnership” that is the full-fledged equivalent of “marriage.” Wash. S.B.
No. 5688 (2009), 2009 Wash. Laws ch. 521 (enacting domestic partnership equivalent of marriage).
See generally Grace Ganz Blumberg, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Conjugal Relationships: The
2003 California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act in Comparative Civil Rights and
Family Law Perspective, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1555 (2004); Turnbull, supra note 22.
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seemed cold, clinical, and often it is misunderstood as a business
relationship.52 The term “reciprocal beneficiary” was also already in use,
having been created by the Hawaii legislature as a compromise offering a
few of the benefits of marriage to couples who could not get married once
the legislature was authorized by a state constitutional amendment to
define marriage as between one man and one woman.53 The Vermont
legislature chose a new term, “civil union.”54
By the time of the superior court decision in Kerrigan in 2006, the
nomenclature issue had already been addressed by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts.55 That court required the state legislature to
accord “marriage” to same-sex couples, not just “civil union,” a
compromise proposed by the state senate.56 And during the pendency of
the Kerrigan lawsuit, the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction was
addressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court.57 The New Jersey court, like
It should be noted that Colorado adopted a “designated beneficiary agreement” statute in April
2009. 2009 Colo. H.B. 1260, 2009 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 107. This law creates a checkoff list of some
of the major benefits and responsibilities available to married couples and makes them available to
unmarried couples, both opposite- and same-sex. The agreement is recorded with the county clerk.
There is thus no need to develop a whole set of legal documents addressing each right or obligation
individually. Moreover, each benefit/obligation can be selected or not, and the two partners need not
adopt each benefit/obligation reciprocally. See Nancy Polikoff, More on Colorado’s Designated
Beneficiary Law, Apr. 22, 2009, available at http://beyondstraightandgaymarriage.blogspot.
com/search/label/Colorado (discussing the Colorado designated beneficiary approach); Nancy Polikoff,
The Extraordinary New Colorado Law. Apr. 15, 2009, available at http://beyondstraightandgay
marriage.blogspot.com/2009/04/extraordinary-new-colorado-law.html (same).
52
ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 61–63 (describing the deliberations of the
House Vermont Judiciary Committee, including rejection of “civil accord” and “civil domestic
partnership” in favor of “civil union”); Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions, supra note 34, at 43 & nn.159–
60 (arguing that “civil union” is a more dignified term than “domestic partnership” and citing to
sources involved in the Vermont litigation and subsequent legislative deliberations); MOATS, supra
note 33, at 197–98 (discussing deliberations of the Vermont House Judiciary Committee rejecting
“domestic partnership” as demeaning and “civil accord” because it sounded like a car, and settling on
“civil union”).
53
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1 to -7; see ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 22–
25 (describing the politics that resulted in Hawaii’s reciprocal beneficiary statute instead of any of
several other alternatives that were considered).
54
In fact, Vermont also established a “reciprocal beneficiary” status in 2000, providing that two
persons related by blood or adoption could establish a legal relationship resembling that of spouses in
certain specified areas. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 1301–1306. This status survives; it is not addressed
by the Vermont marriage equality law. 2009 Vt. Laws 3.
55
See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004) (interpreting the
holding of Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E. 941 (Mass. 2003), to require the legislature
to provide marriage and not just a parallel institution, “civil union,” that might provide all the same
legal benefits but under a different name, while reserving “marriage” for the union of one man and one
woman).
56
Id. at 571 (stating that the court in Goodridge considered not just the tangible benefits of
marriage, but also “whether it was constitutional to create a separate class of citizens by status
discrimination and withhold from that class the right to participate in the institution of civil marriage . .
. . Maintaining a second-class citizen status for same-sex couples by excluding them from the
institution of civil marriage is the constitutional infirmity at issue.” (emphasis in original)).
57
See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221–23 (N.J. 2006) (finding that at least at first it is the role
of the legislature, and not the court, to determine whether to refer to same-sex relationships as
“marriages” or “civil unions”). The court stressed that as a general matter, it “will give . . . deference to
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the court in Vermont, allowed the legislature to decide to create an
alternate legal form, civil unions. To a basically parallel extent, the
California Supreme Court addressed California’s “domestic partnership”
status during the pendency of Kerrigan.58 The California court however
held that only “marriage,” and not “domestic partnership,” would satisfy
All three decisions—
the state constitution’s requirements.59
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and California—were decided by four votes to
three, as was Kerrigan.
The Iowa Supreme Court recently required that same-sex couples be
allowed to marry under the Iowa constitution, 7-0.60 Its opinion cursorily
rejected a “civil union” alternative.61 This decision was handed down in
2009, subsequent to the Kerrigan decision.
In 2008, two state commissions weighed in on the “civil
union”/“marriage” distinction. In April 2008, the Vermont Commission on
Family Recognition and Protection issued a final report after investigating
the differences between civil union and marriage in place in Vermont.62
While this commission was not charged with making a recommendation on
any legislative enactment unless it is unmistakably shown to run afoul of the constitution,” id. at 221,
that “the State has no experience with a civil union construct”, id. at 221–22, and that the court “will
not presume that a difference in name alone is of constitutional magnitude.” Id. at 222. This language
can fairly be read to say that if a civil union construct is tried and shown not to deliver the equality
required by the state constitution, the court may revisit the matter.
58
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 398 (Cal. 2008) (“The question we must address is
whether . . . the failure to designate the official relationship of same-sex couples as marriage violates
the California Constitution.”). The court at one point pointed out a few substantive differences between
California marriage and California domestic partnership, but treated the two statuses as substantially
similar nonetheless. Id. at 416 n.24; see id. at 418 (comparing the California Domestic Partnership Act
to California marriage).
59
Only a relatively short part of the California opinion actually addresses the nomenclature issue.
Compare id. at 434–35 (Part IV.B., explaining why the court need not address whether there is a
fundamental right to have the name “marriage” available to same-sex couples, and indicating it would
address the issue as an equal protection matter) and id. at 444–46 (Part V.C., exploring whether and
how the difference in nomenclature imposes upon a fundamental right to equal dignity and respect in
the official recognition of the family), with, e.g., id. at 419–34 (Part IV.A., addressing the fundamental
right to marry under the California constitution) and id. at 435–44 (Parts V.A. and V.B., addressing
whether the suspect class at issue should be characterized as sex or rather as sexual orientation and, if
the latter, what standard of judicial scrutiny should result) and id. at 446–52 (Part V.D., considering
whether the state’s interest is compelling and its method necessary). Much of In re Marriage Cases
thus seems aimed at established strict scrutiny for statutory distinctions based on sexual orientation and
on characterizing the scope of a fundamental right to marry in a way that is important in contexts far
beyond the narrow question of nomenclature.
60
Varnum v. Brien, -- N.W.2d --, 2009 WL 874044 (Iowa Apr. 3, 2009).
61
Id., 2009 WL 874044 at *29–*30 (considering briefly and rejecting the possibility of allowing
the legislature to develop a recognition with a name other than marriage). The court said, “A new
distinction based on sexual orientation would be equally suspect and difficult to square with the
principles of equal protection embodied in our constitution.” Id. at *30. It did not elaborate.
62
VERMONT 2008 REPORT, supra note 16, at 1. This report should not be confused with THE
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE VERMONT CIVIL UNION COMMISSION (2002),
available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/baker/Final%20CURC%20Report%20for%202002.htm. The
2002 Report found that the civil union law was working as intended and effected compliance with
Baker v. State. Id.
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whether to enact marriage of same-sex couples and declined to do so, it
found that there were significant differences between civil union and
marriage,64 and that a change in the law would remedy those differences to
some extent.65 In April 2009 Vermont responded to this prompting and to
general political pressure by amending its law to recognize marriages by
same-sex couples.66 In December 2008, the New Jersey Civil Union
Review Commission issued its Final Report.67 This commission found
“that the separate categorization established by the Civil Union Act invites
and encourages unequal treatment of same-sex couples and their
children.”68 It unanimously recommended that the legislature expeditiously
amend the state law to allow same-sex couples to marry.69
B. The Holding in Kerrigan on Cognizable Injury
The trial court decision in Kerrigan v. State turned on there being no
cognizable injury to same-sex couples from the new and different name
“civil union,” so long as all the legal rights that the state could deliver had
been conferred on same-sex couples.70 The trial court noted that after the
passage of the Civil Union Act it was faced only with claims based on the
“less tangible effects . . . of civil unions.”71 It listed these alleged injuries72
separately from an earlier list of concrete injuries gleaned from the
63

VERMONT 2008 REPORT, supra note 16, at 28–29.
See id. at 26 (noting the “significant differences between the benefits, privileges, and
responsibilities attached to a civil union versus a heterosexual marriage”).
[T]he Commission finds that . . . a change in the law [recognizing same-sex unions
as marriages] would give access to the less tangible incidents of marriage, including
its terminology (e.g. marriage, wedding, married, celebration, divorce), and its
social, cultural and historical significance. This also would likely enhance the
portability of the underlying legal consequences of the status. Further, providing
statutory access to marriage would be a clearer and more direct statement of full
equality by the state, a statement of full inclusion of its gay and lesbian residents in
the bundle of rights, obligations, protections, and responsibilities flowing from the
status of civil marriage.
Id. at 27.
65
Id.
66
Vt. S.B. 115 (Apr. 7, 2009) (overriding gubernatorial veto) (effective Sept. 1, 2009) (entitled
“An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and Promote Equality in Civil Marriage”).
67
NEW JERSEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 16. Though the Final Report was issued after the
Kerrigan decision, an Interim Report from February 2008 was available at the time Kerrigan was
decided. It is appended to the Final Report. Id. at Appendix A. The California same-sex marriage
decision cites the New Jersey Interim Report. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 446 (Cal. 2008).
68
NEW JERSEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.
69
Id. at 3.
70
Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89, 94–101 (Conn. Super. 2006), rev’d, 957 A.2d. 407 (Conn.
2008).
71
Kerrigan, 909 A.2d at 96. It pointedly noted that plaintiffs did not amend their complaint after
enactment of the Civil Union Act. Id. at 93.
72
The effects alleged included a sense of unworthiness or inequality; a sense of second class
status; humiliation; a feeling of being inferior and being demeaned; a lack of recognition by others; and
a denial of the instant communication that “marriage” allows. Id. at 94.
64
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73

plaintiffs’ affidavits —an implicit contrast of tangible and intangible
injuries. After examining several theories propounded by the plaintiffs,74
the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted the
state’s motion.75
The Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed. It held that “the trial court
improperly determined that the distinction between civil unions and
marriage is constitutionally insignificant merely because a same sex couple
who enters into a civil union enjoys the same legal rights as an opposite
sex couple who enters into marriage.”76 It found, by a four to three
majority, that there was a cognizable harm when the distinction between
“civil union” and “marriage” was read “in light of the pernicious history of
discrimination faced by gay men and lesbians, and because the institution
of marriage carries with a status and significance that the newly created
classification of civil unions does not embody . . . .”77 Let us call these the
background of stigma and the distinction of status issues. The court then
proceeded to determine that the legislative distinction was based on sexual
orientation,78 that it should be subject to heightened, intermediate
scrutiny,79 and that the state “had failed to provide sufficient justification
for excluding homosexual couples from the institution of marriage.”80 The
Connecticut Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the state and instead granted summary
judgment to plaintiffs.
The Kerrigan majority holding on cognizable injury81 is relatively
brief, especially when one looks only to the court’s own language and
pares away the quotations from other nomenclature cases,82 the quotations
from the plaintiffs’ brief and an amicus brief,83 the quotation from Ronald
Dworkin,84 and the lengthy footnote disagreeing with the dissents’ analyses
of cognizable injury.85 Indeed, I ultimately find I have to rely on the
reasoning in some of these quotations themselves to supplement some of
73
These included refusal of a hospital to allow one partner access to the other or designation as
next of kin; denial of a home construction loan; inability of one partner to list the other as a dependant
for purposes of employer-provided health insurance; and succession rights for basketball season tickets.
Id. at 91.
74
Id. at 96–101.
75
Id. at 102.
76
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 415.
77
Id. at 412.
78
Id. at 412; see id. at 431 n.24.
79
Id. at 412; see id. at 431–76.
80
Id. at 412; see id. at 476–81.
81
Id. at 416–20.
82
Id. at 417.
83
Id. at 417 n.14 (quoting brief of Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund); id. at 418 (quoting
plaintiffs’ brief).
84
Id. at 418 n.15 (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Three Questions for America, N.Y. REVIEW OF
BOOKS, Sept. 21, 2006, at 24, 30).
85
Id. at 419 n.16.

2009]

NAME CALLING

1445

the court’s reasoning.
The court’s explanation pretty much boils down to the consequences of
the indisputable fact that the government has “singled out” a group, “gay
persons,” for differential treatment.86 The legislature thus “declares them
to be unworthy of the institution of marriage.”87 It has given this group “a
lesser status,”88 a second-class citizen status.89 The court cites a
Connecticut employment discrimination advertising case for the
proposition that differential classification creates a real harm, even though
it is symbolic and intangible harm.90 The court also invokes Brown v.
Board of Education for the proposition that separate cannot be equal, at
least when the distinction involves a politically disfavored or historically
unpopular minority.91 The court notes that “[i] n such circumstances, the
very existence of the classification gives credence to the perception that
separate treatment is warranted for the same illegitimate reasons that gave
rise to the past discrimination in the first place.”92 That’s about it for the
reasons provided. Denying same-sex couples the right to marry effectively
signals a continuing lesser status for gay persons as a group, which could
fuel the perception that differential treatment of gay persons is warranted,
even though similar past discrimination has been deemed illegitimate.
I do not think this reasoning is wrong; but it is awfully terse. And a
great deal of the reasoning hinges on how one interprets the differential
treatment of gay persons in the Act. Here I think it becomes crucial that
the issue is, in significant part, the legal name “marriage” (and associated
ceremonial and kinship names) as compared to the legal name “civil
union.” And here the court says basically nothing. It compares the two as
institutions, without noticing that as those institutions operate in everyday
life they depend on iterated instances of naming practices and related
kinship-recognizing ceremonies to confer and reproduce relationships of
identity, status, and kinship. As I will develop, more focus on the name
aspect of the distinction may help us better appreciate the correctness of
86

Id. at 416 (using the term “differential treatment” twice).
Id. at 417.
88
Id. at 419.
89
Id. at 417 (quoting Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004)); id. at 418
(quoting plaintiffs’ brief).
90
Id. at 418 (citing Evening Sentinel v. National Organization for Women, 357 A.2d 498 (Conn.
1975)). Evening Sentinel involved a challenge to the newspaper’s practice of separating “help wanted”
ads into jobs to men, for women, and for either. Evening Sentinel, 357 A.2d at 501. The Connecticut
Supreme Court determined that this constituted “aiding and abetting” employment discrimination,
which was prohibited under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. Evening Sentinel is not a
constitutional case at all, let alone a “cognizable injury” case. Nevertheless, in its focus on how
practices of differential categorization can contribute to specific discriminatory practices, it turns out to
be relevant, even though the Kerrigan did not expressly explore this dimension of Evening Sentinel.
See infra Part IV.B.
91
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 418 (Conn. 2008) (citing inter alia Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)).
92
Id. at 419.
87
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the result.
The Kerrigan decision’s section on cognizable claim calls for several
further comments. To begin with, the court’s word “declares” is an
overstatement, as the legislature did not, in the statute itself, “declare” in so
many words that gay persons were unworthy of marriage. It simply
withheld the name (and thus also the identity and status) of marriage,
creating a parallel but differently named institution, and it included other
language about equality of rights and the equivalence of the different
names. As other sentences from the Kerrigan majority opinion make clear,
the differential status is an inference, not a legislative declaration. “[C]ivil
unions are perceived to be inferior to marriage.”93 “[T]he very existence
of the distinction gives credence to the perception that separate treatment is
warranted . . . .”94 The operative question is not what the legislature said,
or even what it intended, but what inference is to be drawn from the
distinction created by the Act. As New Jersey Chief Justice Poritz wrote,
in a passage quoted by the Kerrigan majority, “the [s]tate declares that it is
legitimate to differentiate between [the] commitments [of same-sex
couples] and the commitments of heterosexual couples.”95 And as the
California Supreme Court majority wrote, in a passage quoted by the
Kerrigan majority, drawing this distinction “pose[s] a serious risk of
denying the official family relationships of same-sex couples the equal
dignity and respect that is a core element of the constitutional right to
marry.”96
In assessing how to interpret the Act’s distinction of nomenclature, the
court notably does not rely on either legislative history or on the kind of
fact-finding that Justice Borden, writing in dissent, thinks should be
required.97 The court instead relies on two social facts:98 the vast, multiple,
and unique importance of marriage as an institution,99 and the history of
prejudice and discrimination against gay persons.100 In two respects then,
the neologism “civil union” and the new institution civil union are read in
the context of a particular history, tradition, and culture. It is “the exalted
status of marriage” that makes civil union, by comparison, interpretable as
an “inferior” institution.101 It is “past discrimination”102 for “illegitimate
93

Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
95
Id. at 417 (quoting Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 226 (N.J. 2006) (Poritz, C.J., concurring and
dissenting)).
96
Id. (quoting In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 434–35 (Cal. 2008)).
97
See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 484–86 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J.,
dissenting).
98
The term “social fact” actually comes from Justice Borden’s dissent. Id. at 486.
99
Id. at 416–18 & nn.14–15 (majority opinion).
100
Id. at 417 (discussing prejudice on its own, and also cross-referencing Section V.A. of the
opinion, concerning the history of persecution and disadvantage).
101
Id. at 418.
102
Id. at 419.
94
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103

reasons” against a “politically unpopular or historically disfavored”104
minority that triggers the conclusion that separate legal treatment now,
standing alone, is constitutionally suspect. Each of these background
social facts actually gets considerable attention elsewhere in the opinion,
which may help to account for the brevity of the cognizable injury section.
Despite the “fundamental” and “basic” vocabulary deployed by the
court when assessing traditional marriage, the court does not, as such, find
a fundamental right to marry that extends to same-sex couples.105
Ultimately its decision turns on equal protection analysis, not due
process.106 Rather, the fundamental right discussion is put to work as part
of an analysis about what is withheld in reserving the name “marriage” for
opposite-sex couples.
Judge Borden, writing in dissent, agrees that “there is enough of a
difference between the new institution of civil union and the ancient
institution of marriage to permit a constitutional challenge on equal
protection grounds.”107 But he would put the plaintiffs to evidentiary
proof, and disagrees with the majority conclusion that there can be no
doubt that this difference is an established fact rather than a fact to be
determined later in the case.108 He also points out that “civil union” is
novel.109 He concludes:
At this point in our history, however, and without any
appropriate fact-finding on the issue, I am unable to say that
[civil union] is widely considered to be less than or inferior to
marriage, or that it does not bring with it the same social
recognition as marriage. It is simply too early to know this
with any reasonable measure of certitude.110
Thus, while the majority interprets the Act against a backdrop of a history
of prejudice directed to GLBT folks, Justice Borden views civil union
against a blank backdrop—there is no history to the term, and the history
of treatment of GLBT people against which the novel term might be
interpreted is not considered.
Justice Borden also refers, more than once, to social flux around
103

Id. at 484–85 (Borden, J., dissenting).
Id. at 418 (majority opinion).
105
Contrast other opinions on nomenclature, which do find a fundamental right to marry that
includes same-sex couples. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 399–400 (Cal. 2008); Lewis
v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 227–29 (N.J. 2006) (Poritz, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
106
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 482 (holding that “equal protection principles” require that same-sex
couples be permitted to marry).
107
Id. at 483 (Borden, J., dissenting).
108
Id. at 484–85. He writes, “[T]o the extent that the perceived status of civil unions in this state
is factual in nature, the majority has, by making findings regarding that status, exceeded this court’s
power.” Id. at 485.
109
Id. at 485–86.
110
Id. at 486.
104
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112

norms. He cites and quotes Baker v. State, which did leave the choice
of remedy to the legislature, but expressly as a matter of remedy and even
of political strategy—not because of lack of evidence as to harm.113 And
Borden appears to overlook In re Marriage Cases114 and Goodridge v.
Dep’t of Public Health115 as interpreted in Opinion of the Justices.116
These cases decided the nomenclature distinction question at the summary
judgment stage, without fact-finding. The majority responds to this point
of Justice Borden’s about improper fact-finding by characterizing it as a
“refusal to concede the obvious.”117 What is obvious to the majority is that
a recently created institution—civil union—cannot possibly “embody the
same status as an institution of such long-standing and overriding societal
importance as marriage.”118
The Connecticut Supreme Court also did not address some of the
cognizable claim arguments decided the other way in the opinion below.
The Connecticut Superior Court, per Judge Pittman, had noted that the
plaintiffs sought to base their civil rights claims on a set of “rather less
tangible effects of the status of civil unions.”119 These included (1) a claim
of a fundamental right to marry under Connecticut law;120 (2) a claim of
injury because civil union was a “lesser status . . . distinct from the more
privileged status of marriage;”121 (3) an argument that “the statutory
scheme is a form of ‘separate but equal’ segregation;”122 (4) a claim of
injury because of “the unfamiliarity of civil unions in common social or
legal currency, [such] that the plaintiffs must constantly explain their legal
status to others;”123 and (5) injury caused by the lack of legal recognition in
other jurisdictions of the unfamiliar status of civil union—so-called
“portability” of the legal status.124 Holding that “[n]one of these [claims]
rises to the level of legal harm required to declare judgment in [plaintiffs’]
favor,”125 the court granted the state’s motion for summary judgment and
111
Id.; see also id. at 503–05 (comparing slow social change, legislative change, and judicially
mandated change).
112
Id. at 486–87 (quoting Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 888 (Vt. 1999)).
113
Baker, 744 A.2d at 886–89.
114
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
115
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
116
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
117
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 419 n.16 (Conn. 2008).
118
Id. Here and at an earlier point in this section of the opinion, the majority points out that most
married couples would not exchange their marriage for a “civil union,” even with all the legal rights
and benefits intact. Id. at 417 n.14, 419 n.16.
119
Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89, 96 (Conn. Super. 2006).
120
Id. at 96; see id. at 96–97(discussing this claim).
121
Id. at 96; see id. at 97–98 (discussing this claim).
122
Id. at 96; see id. at 98–100 (discussing this claim).
123
Id. at 96; see id. at 100–01 (discussing this claim).
124
Id. at 96; see id. at 101 (discussing this claim).
125
Id. at 96. As to the so-called “portability” issue (recognition of a Connecticut same-sex union
in other jurisdictions), the lower court did concede that this particular injury from non-recognition was
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126

dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims.
The second and third of these claims—lesser status for civil unions and
“separate but equal” segregation for gay persons—formed the core of the
Connecticut Supreme Court’s analysis. Its opinion did not separately
address the fundamental right to marry, nor did it address the two nonrecognition injuries—unfamiliarity in everyday life, that is, social nonrecognition, and legal non-recognition.
Justice Zarella also very briefly agreed that the plaintiffs had raised a
cognizable claim, but thought that was so because civil union, having been
created by statute, can be taken away, while marriage, as a fundamental
right, may not, in his view, be repealed legislatively.127 The majority
briefly rebutted this approach, essentially saying that it is speculative:128
nothing suggests that the legislature intends to repeal the civil union law.129
I think the majority has the better of this one.
III. OF NAMES, NAMING, AND IDENTITIES
Much headway can be made in elaborating the concerns underlying the
Kerrigan court’s reasoning on cognizable injury by considering several
aspects of Thomas Healy’s fine account of stigmatic injury and federal
standing130 (to be sure, Healy is talking about federal courts and Kerrigan
is a state court decision) and Charles Lawrence’s project to foreground
“cultural meaning” as central to the antidiscrimination project.131 If we
“real.” Id. at 101. But it was “not caused by the nomenclature used in the Connecticut legislation.” Id.
The court found that that injury was caused by other states’ non-recognition, not Connecticut’s
nomenclature. Id. (ruling on the portability problem as a cognizable injury). Apparently Judge Pittman
thought that the difference between a Connecticut “civil union” and a Connecticut “marriage” would
not make a difference to other jurisdictions, a conclusion with which others have disagreed. See
ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 137 (speculating that a same-sex “marriage” might
be more portable than a same-sex “civil union”); Henry Gottlieb, New Jersey Judge, Citing Comity,
Grants Divorce to Gay Couple Married in Canada, 195:7 N.J.L.J, Feb. 16, 2009 (describing oral
opinion in Hammond v. Hammond, No. FM-11-905-08 (N.J. Super. 2009), in which a family part judge
granted a same-sex couple divorce from a Canadian marriage, even though New Jersey only recognizes
civil unions, in order to assure that the New Jersey divorce would be recognized in jurisdictions that
recognize marriage by same-sex couples).
126
The court also included a short section on the respective roles of legislature and judiciary,
tipping its deferential hat to the legislature in matters of public policy. Id. at 101–02.
127
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 516 (2008) (Zarella, J. dissenting). To the
extent that Justice Zarella’s argument suggests, more or less explicitly, that it would be unconstitutional
for the state legislature to redefine marriage by giving it a different name, he raises a most interesting
issue, but one beyond the scope of this Article.
128
Id. at 419 n.16 (majority opinion).
129
Id.
130
Healy, supra note 35.
131
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) [hereinafter Lawrence, The Id, the Ego]. Lawrence has recently
elaborated on ways in which this project was misunderstood and misapplied. Charles Lawrence III,
Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Origins and Impact of “The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection,” 40 CONN. L. REV. 931 (2008) [hereinafter Lawrence, Unconscious Racism] (explaining
the origins and reception of Lawrence’s 1987 article).
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supplement these with Kenneth Karst’s insights about the overarching
constitutional value of inclusive equal citizenship,132 especially as applied
to religious display cases under the Establishment Clause, we can better
discern the underpinnings of the Kerrigan majority’s succinct argument on
cognizable injury. These authorities’ insights are brought to bear on the
“civil union”/“marriage” distinction in Part IV. First, however, we will
benefit by considering that this particular injury is about which legal
name(s) to authorize for use for a central social category. This Part
presents some insights that can be gleaned from focusing on names,
identities, statuses, and the social processes in and through which they
interact.
As Elizabeth Emens writes, “Names are peculiarly situated as among
our most trivial, and yet most foundational, social practices.”133 She is
writing about proper names, and particularly about married women taking
their husbands’ surnames, but her introductory observations are useful to
us as well, as a catalog of some of the functions of names for people,
including not just proper names but names related to kinship. Names are
“constitutive.”134 They may link us to families and kinship networks.135
Having a name at all “is thought to be a fundamental element of identity
and dignity.”136 Emens also notes, in the context of the gender-related
naming practices she is exploring, that men keep the honorific prefix “Mr.”
whether or not married, whereas women may be expected to change from
“Miss” to “Mrs.”137 I will draw on this last example in a subsequent
section, in order to illustrate the stakes in the “civil union”/“marriage”
distinction and to note some of the strategies of resistance to legally
changing kinship names, in terms of trivializing the work that names do.138
A. “What’s in a Name?”
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Justice Sosman, in her separate
opinion in Opinions of the Justices, characterizes the issue of the
distinction between “civil union” and “marriage” as “a squabble over the
name to be used”139 and “a pitched battle over who gets to use the ‘m’

132
See, e.g., KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 36; Karst, Justice O’Connor, supra
note 37, Karst, The First Amendment, supra note 38; Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship, supra note
36.
133
Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital
Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 768 (2007).
134
Id. at 769.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 769–70.
138
See infra Part III.C.
139
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004) (separate opinion of
Sosman, J.).
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word.”
She cites to Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet for “[t]he
insignificance of according a different name to the same thing . . . .”141 Her
reading of the scene and the play is seriously wrong. A correct reading
will illuminate part of the stakes in names, especially family names and
kinship names, and thus will help us with a better description of the stakes
in the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction. This is not to say that Justice
Sosman is mistaken in identifying the question as whether a separate name
for civil union rises to the level of a constitutional injury;142 but she cannot
dismiss the dispute as “insignificant”143 just because it is about names.144
In the famous balcony scene from Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet,
Juliet asks the question “What’s in a name?” She continues, poetically,
romantically: “What’s in a name? that which we call a rose, / By any other
name would smell as sweet. / So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call’d,
/ Retain that dear perfection which he owes / Without that title:—Romeo,
doff thy name, / and for that name, which is no part of thee, / Take all
myself.”145 The problem of course is that Romeo is a Montague and Juliet
is a Capulet. Those are not just the young lovers’ names, but also family
names and identities, and those identities are themselves embedded in the
society and history of the city-state of Verona. The two families Montague
and Capulet are sworn enemies. The names may belong to Romeo and
Juliet, among others, but the names also mark Romeo and Juliet and bind
them to their families’ feud. Romeo and Juliet are, thus, caught up against
their wills because of who they are, as marked by their names. The love
between Romeo and Juliet is, thus, a forbidden love.
Indeed, just a moment earlier in the balcony scene, Juliet has said “
140

Id.
Id. at n.1.
142
See, e.g., id. at 572–73 (framing the issue in the case as one of whether reserving the name
“marriage” for different sex couples even presents an issue of constitutional dimension); see also id. at
581 (separate opinion of Cordy, J.) (“Assuming . . . . that a difference in statutory name would itself
have to rest on a rational basis, I would withhold judgment until such time as the Legislature completed
its deliberative process before concluding that there was or was not such a basis.”).
143
Id. at 573 (separate opinion of Sosman, J.).
144
New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Albin, in his majority opinion, also quotes the “what’s in a
name” line, but writes that the question is “perplexing” and that “in the cultural clash over same-sex
marriage, the word marriage itself—independent of the rights and benefits of marriage—has an
evocative and important meaning to both parties.” Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221 (N.J. 2006). He
too concludes that the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction is not of constitutional dimension. Id. At
least for the time being, though, his opinion is susceptible of allowing marriage equality advocates to
return to the court if, in practice, civil union falls short of the underlying principle of equality
established in the case. That is, in fact, exactly what the New Jersey Civil Union Commission has just
found. NEW JERSEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 1–3. Failing a legislative response one may
expect another marriage equality lawsuit in New Jersey.
145
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO & JULIET, act 2, sc. 2, lines 43–49. Some versions appear to
have “a rose by any other word would smell as sweet.” (emphasis added). Compare THE WORKS OF
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, COMPLETE 1063, 1074 (Walter J. Black, Inc. 1944) (act 2, sc. 2, line 43)
(“name”), with THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE 1114 (G. Blakemore Evans et al. eds., 2d ed. 1997) (act
2, sc. 2, line 43) (“word”). I leave this textual difference to Shakespeare scholars to sort out.
141
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‘Tis but thy name that is my enemy. / Thou art thyself though, not a
Montague. / What’s Montague? It is not hand, nor foot, / nor arm, nor face,
nor any other part / Belonging to a man. O be some other name!”146 Then
comes the “What’s in a name?” part. Interesting sequence: Juliet fancies
Romeo to be no more than hand, foot, arm, face, and unspecified “other
parts.” (What parts? Think about it!)147 If that were all Romeo amounted
to, he would then be free, or at least freer, to marry her. But Romeo is no
more just a body than a rose is just a smell. He has a lineage. “Montague”
is not just a name, it is a family name. “Montague” and “Capulet” identify
who Romeo and Juliet are, their kin, their identity, and whom they may
and may not marry. To speak abstractly, the family names carry with them
a whole set of entrenched behaviors and associations, calling up social
relations and obligations, as recognized and reacted to by braggart kinsmen
and meddlesome servants and friars. The inherited tradition that makes up
an undeniable part of Romeo’s identity and is called up and fixed by his
name cannot be doffed, as he and Juliet would wish.148 It is not his alone.
In Romeo and Juliet, the two young lovers do their best to escape their
inherited family enmity, as marked and perpetuated by their names.
Things go badly, through happenstance and misunderstanding, and in the
end, they die.149
B. Interpellation: Names that Call Us
Meanwhile, a very different tradition offers a similar perspective on
the pervasive power of names, especially names that identify and
reproduce social relations and the culture and history that those names

146

SHAKESPEARE, supra note 145, at act 2, sc. 2, lines 38–42.
Actually, the more current and respected of the two versions of Romeo and Juliet that I
consulted shows “nor any other parts” in brackets, suggesting some question about its authenticity; but
the critical footnotes do not offer any explanation. RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE, supra note 145, at 1114
(act 2, sc. 2, line 41). The two editions also exhibit some minor variations in punctuation.
148
Earlier yet in the scene Juliet has said “O Romeo, Romeo! Wherefore art thou Romeo? / Deny
thy father and refuse thy name; / Or, if thou wilt not, be but sworn my love, / and I’ll no longer be a
Capulet.” SHAKESPEARE, supra note 145, at act 2, sc. 2, lines 33–36.
149
Shakespeare often portrays young couples embroiled in confusions about who they are and
whom they may marry, but these embroglios do not always end in tragedy. Cf. WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE WINTER’S TALE, acts 4 and 5. The second half of this play turns in part on a
struggle of young lovers to wed, seemingly against their names’ destiny. Florizel, Prince of Bohemia,
conceals his identity in order to woo and wed Perdita, whom he believes to be a simple village girl. His
father King Polixenes discovers the plot and forbids the two ever to see one another again. The couple
flees to the court of King Leontes of Sicilia, pursued by Polixenes. It is eventually revealed to all that
Perdita (unbeknownst to her and everyone else) is actually the long-lost daughter of King Leontes; she
survived abandonment in the wild as an infant. Thus, Florizel’s attempt to marry Perdita by doffing his
identity fails, but by happenstance Perdita is not what she seems. Recovering her lost identity and her
kingdom, her true identity now makes the young couple’s marriage fit and possible. By the way,
“perdita” is Latin for lost, in the feminine. The discovery of Perdita’s true name and identity fulfills a
prophecy that things will be set right only when what was lost is found. Oh Shakespeare!
147
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represent. Louis Althusser, a fervent Marxist theorist, inquires how the
relations of production are themselves reproduced, and focuses on ideology
as that which keeps people in their social roles in ways that feed the
processes of capitalism.151 As part of this inquiry, he introduces the useful
concept of interpellation, or hailing.152 One need not partake of Marxist
sentiment to appreciate the usefulness of Althusser’s concept.
Althusser posits that individuals live within an ideology, that is, “a
determinate (religious, ethical, etc.) representation of the world . . . .”153
They cannot do otherwise. “Ideology represents the imaginary relationship
of individuals to their real conditions of existence.”154 Moreover, ideology
is not freestanding in some abstract or ideal sense. “Ideology has a
material existence.”155 Althusser has previously identified a set of
“Ideological State Apparatuses,” which include the religious, the
educational, the family, the legal, the political, the trade union, the
communications media, and the cultural.156 Using a different terminology
than Althusser’s, we might well call these the principal non-governmental
mechanisms and institutions of civil society. The material aspects of
ideology are manifested through these various apparatuses and their
practices as individuals engage them.157
Ideology sets up the attitudes of individual subjects through material
practices.158 “The individual . . . behaves in such and such a way, adopts
such and such a practical attitude, and . . . participates in certain regular
practices which are those of the ideological apparatus . . . .”159 These
practices take the form of everyday rituals—a mass, a funeral, a sports
match, a school day, a political party meeting.160 The individual’s
behavior, attitudes, and practices depend on ideological apparatuses, even
though the individual believes that s/he “has in all consciousness freely
chosen as a subject.”161 Ideology and individual practices are thus (my
words) mutually dependent. Althusser claims that “there is no practice
except by and in an ideology”162 and at the same time that “there is no
150
See, e.g., Fredric Jameson, Introduction, in LOUIS ALTHUSSER, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND
OTHER ESSAYS vii, vii (Ben Brewster trans., Monthly Review Press 2001) (1971) (describing
Althusser’s lifelong membership in the French Communist Party and his struggles within the party
against Stalinist orthodoxy).
151
ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation), in
ALTHUSSER, supra note 150, at 85, 85, 89 (Ben Brewster trans., Monthly Review Press 2001) (1971).
152
Id. at 117–20.
153
Id. at 113.
154
Id. at 109 (emphasis omitted). This is Althusser’s statement of his first thesis in this essay.
155
Id. at 112 (emphasis omitted). This is Althusser’s statement of his second thesis in this essay.
156
Id. at 96.
157
Id. at 112–13.
158
Id. at 113.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 114.
161
Id. at 113.
162
Id. at 115.
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163

ideology except by the subject and for subjects.” Elsewhere in the essay
he writes that ideology and individual subjects are “doubly speculary,”164
meaning that ideology and individual subjects mirror one another and
ensure and perpetuate each others’ functioning.
“Interpellation” is a way of expressing the idea that individuals depend
on ideology, which depends on them. Althusser writes, “[i]deology
[i]nterpellates [i]ndividuals as [s]ubjects.”165 The most familiar example of
interpellation that Althusser provides is of someone turning around in
response to a policeman shouting “Hey, you there!”166 This person thus
becomes the subject who was addressed.167 He or she recognized that
he/she was the person really hailed, and turned around.168
Althusser’s example is sometimes misunderstood.
He himself
immediately apologizes for presenting the hailing scenario as a temporal
sequence—walking, hailing, turning.169 “[I]n reality these things happen
without any succession. The existence of ideology and the hailing . . . of
individuals as subjects are one and the same thing.”170 As a consequence,
Althusser insists that “ideology has always-already interpellated
individuals as subjects.”171
This perhaps jargony formulation is illustrated by an example whose
relevance to our topic may be clear, as it involves inherited family
ideologies and structures. Althusser notes
the ideological ritual that surrounds the expectation of a
“birth” . . . . Everyone knows how much and in what way an
unborn child is expected . . . . Before its birth, the child is . . .
always-already a subject, appointed as a subject in and by the
specific familial ideological configuration in which it is
“expected” once it has been conceived . . . [T]his familial
ideological configuration is, in its uniqueness, highly
structured . . . . [I]t is in this implacable and more or less
“pathological” . . . structure that the former subject-to-be will
have to “find” “its” place, i.e., “become” the sexual subject
(boy or girl) which it already is in advance.172
We will return in a moment to this characterization of family and gender
163
Id. Althusser calls this a process of “double constitution,” in which individuals constitute
ideology even as ideology constitutes individual subjects. Id. at 116.
164
Id. at 122 (emphasis omitted).
165
Id. at 115 (emphasis omitted).
166
Id. at 118.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 119.
172
Id..
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structure in particular as already-given and implacable. For the moment let
us notice just the idea that we are inevitably born into social structures,
which shape our view of ourselves and our culture and world.
Another potential mishap, perhaps, with Althusser’s policeman hailing
example is that it involves police. In a footnote, Althusser points out that
the societal practice of police hailing of suspects “takes a quite ‘special’
form . . . .”173 Thus it is not, in respect of its involving a policeman, a
generalizable example. Because the hailer is given concrete form as a
policeman, the process of interpellation can be misunderstood as limited to
state actors, or as involving the threat of the exercise of force by some
legal authority. This is not accurate. Althusser’s cataloguing of
Ideological State Apparatuses is expressly not about the state as a separate
and partial force. Althusser is investigating the pervasive operation of
ideology throughout society. Moreover, Althusser argues that the legal
system is special; it occupies a dual position, both as what he calls a
“Repressive State Apparatus” that depends principally on violence, and as
an “Ideological State Apparatus” that depends primarily on ideology for its
functioning.174 Althusser expressly locates the functioning of the legal
system in both the Repressive State Apparatus and the Ideological State
Apparatus.175 The basic mechanism in the hailing and turning process is a
recognition each of the other, expressed in action, that constitutes subjects
within a social framework. It is ideological and does not depend on the
threat of violence.
Fredric Jameson offers a succinct summary of interpellation and of its
implications for social change in the direction of social justice.
Interpellation is
the way in which the social order speaks to us as individuals
and as it were calls us by name. It can best be understood as
the system of roles and social positions contained in the
impersonal and collective Symbolic Order: the latter
furnishes us the options available in our social and historical
176
moment.
Our social and historical order, contingent as it is, furnishes us our options.
But we do have a choice, according to Jameson.
We can simply adopt one of these, or we can refuse them all
in revolt; or finally we can attempt to invent new ones, for
which our society has not yet provided. The constraints of
interpellation are simply the possibilities or our own
173

Id. at 118 n.18.
Id. at 97–98.
175
Id. at 90, 96.
176
Jameson, supra note 150, at xiv.
174
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historical situation, the hand we have been dealt by history,
177
the terms with which we must work.
José Gabilondo also provides a useful, succinct summary of
interpellation. “In general, interpellation is the notion that systems of ideas
are the medium through which a person finds one’s sense of self and
comes to recognize oneself as an emotionally and politically sentient
178
Like Jameson, Gabilondo finds within the broad concept of
subject.”
interpellation room to maneuver. He describes “interpellative advocacy,” a
goal of “coming to speech,” as part of a certain homosexual political and
cultural project.179 Gabilondo thus proposes conceiving of certain kinds of
cultural and legal moves in support of homosexual recognition and respect
as interventions in processes of interpellation.
Althusser’s presentation of interpellation suggests a special relevance
of the concept to consideration of the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction.
The process of naming and turning is about recognition. Family structures
and rituals, and indeed specifically gendered family structures, may be
paradigmatic examples of the background processes against which new
forms of individual and collective identity must work to emerge and
achieve recognition. I will spend a moment more here on ideas of family
and recognition as glimpsed in the Althusser essay, as well as on a third
topic—the sense of timelessness, obviousness, and naturalness generated
by ideological operations of interpellation.
As to family, I have just quoted portions of the most extended
treatment in Althusser’s essay. At the moment it is conceived, the as-yetunborn child is already subject to ideological ritual and expectation. The
180
specific form imposed may vary historically and culturally, but central
characteristics of the child’s identity are always predetermined one way or
another. This is hardly an exceptionable or solely Marxist point. In a very
different idiom, for example, Charles Taylor argues that human life is
181
We must acquire language and
fundamentally dialogical in character.
other modes of expression by which we define ourselves through
exchanges with others.182 This fact is true at the beginning of our lives,
and continues throughout our lives.183 Taylor’s formulation tends more to
177

Id.
José Gabilondo, Asking the Straight Question: How to Come to Speech in Spite of Conceptual
Liquidation as a Homosexual, 21 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2–3 (2006).
179
Id. at 3 (referring to DIDIER ERIBON, INSULT AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY SELF 9 (Michael
Lucey trans., 2004) (1994)).
180
Althusser says that we can set aside the specifics of the forms for family ideology—there will
always be one or another to assign the child an identity. ALTHUSSER, supra note 150, at 119.
181
Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 32 (Amy Guttman ed., 1994).
182
Id.
183
Id. at 32–33.
178
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the possibility of individual negotiation and change than Althusser’s,
though I think Jameson’s and Gabilondo’s versions of interpellation also
do suggest the possibility of change. But change must occur against a
background ideology that is determined by others and inherited.
Althusser’s account also recognizes that the family serves multiple
functions, being at one and the same time a source of ideology, a source of
184
Again this is hardly
labor power, and a focus of consumption.
exceptionable. The family is also a principal source and an important
185
As Judith Butler has
locus of the functioning of sex/gender identity.
written, the infant is “brought into the domain of language and kinship
through the interpellation of gender.”186
As to recognition, interpellation is clearly an ongoing process of
mutual and mutually reinforcing recognitions. Again the police hailing
example, while it does contain mutual recognition, could be misleading. It
could be read as unidirectional. Althusser provides other examples. One is
of recognizing a friend through a door (the knock, the voice saying “It’s
187
me.”, and then the door opening so that recognition is confirmed).
Another is of recognizing a previous acquaintance and demonstrating that
recognition with “material ritual practice[s] of ideological recognition in
188
The practice of
everyday life”—in France a greeting and a handshake.
189
190
recognition is “incessant,”
mutual (if not necessarily symmetrical),
and occurs through “concrete” and “everyday life” “practices” and
“practical rituals.”191
Using my terminology, I might say that
interpellation, insofar as it consists of material practices and rituals, is very
often about microinteractions in which microperformances are interpreted
in mutually reinforcing ways.
Another set of characteristics that Althusser notes concerning
interpellation, and which I wish to mention here, involves obviousness,
naturalness, and timelessness. These characteristics describe what I would
call the phenomenology of interpellation. This discussion could take us far
afield, but it is necessary, because these characteristics are highly relevant
to the marriage controversy, and in particular, to the evident resistance to
changing the name of marriage or its opposite-sex defining characteristic.
184
185

girl).

ALTHUSSER, supra note 151, at 96 & n.8.
Id. at 119 (discussing how the unborn child will have to become the sexual subject, boy or

186
JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF SEX 7 (1993). As
Butler notes, the “founding interpellation is reiterated by various authorities and a various intervals of
time” and is thus “the repeated inculcation of a norm.” Id. at 7–8.
187
ALTHUSSER, supra note 151, at 117.
188
Id. My two years living in France also suggest a “kiss kiss” on both cheeks for family and
close friends.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
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Many traditionalists perceive marriage as obvious, natural, and timeless,
and therefore not legitimately subject to processes of social change or to
legislative or judicial redefinition.
Althusser writes, “It is indeed a peculiarity of ideology that it imposes .
. . obviousnesses as obviousnesses, which we cannot fail to recognize and
for which we have the inevitable and natural reaction of crying out (aloud
or in the ‘still, small voice of conscience’): ‘That’s obvious! That’s right!
192
Much of the recognition involved in interpellation is
That’s true.’”
transparent, and not in a good sense. It is the transparency that Barbara
Flagg questions in her critique of transparently white decisionmaking, for
193
It is the obviousness that Sandra Bem identifies as one of the
example.
three lenses of gender—naturalness or, as she sometimes calls it,
194
essentialization.
In a sense, the obviousness or naturalness of many
everyday experiences of recognition can lead the subject to misunderstand
what is going on as fixed and natural, rather than as speculary and in some
important sense contingently (re)produced.
When that sense of
obviousness and naturalness sets in, an attempt to question or change the
microprocesses will be resisted as confusing, non-obvious, and unnatural.
Althusser, in exploring an extended example of interpellation, not
195
coincidentally uses a particular version of Christianity as his example.
The eternal, universal, timeless claims offered by the version of
Christianity that Althusser describes are reflected in some traditionalists’
similar rhetoric (that is, that one-man-one-woman marriage is timeless and
is ordained by God) directed specifically at the slow revolution in
legislative or judicial redefinition of marriage.196 But discussion of the
192

Id. at 116.
Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2029 (1995) (arguing that expectations around workplace
behavior are culturally conditioned to express and reproduce white norms in a way that whites are
unaware of, in other words, that is transparent to them).
194
SANDRA LIPSITZ BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON SEXUAL
INEQUALITY 2–3, 6–38 (1993). The other two lenses Bem identifies are gender polarization and
androcentrism, that is, favoring men over women. Id. at 2–3. See generally Marc R. Poirier, Hastening
the Kulturkampf: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the Politics of American Masculinity, 12 LAW &
SEXUALITY 271, 303–06 (2003) [hereinafter Poirier, Hastening] (discussing generally and with
reference to Bem the political consequences of de-essentializing gender).
195
ALTHUSSER, supra note 151, at 120–22.
196
Some traditionalists might welcome a sufficiently slow “slow revolution” of law as the
recognition of a Burkean evolution of custom. See, e.g., Jonathan Rauch, Not Whether But How: Gay
Marriage and the Revival of Burkean Conservatism, 50 SO. TEX. L. REV. 1 (2008). In Rauch’s
analysis, once the same-sex marriage issue became salient, both the political left advocating marriage
equality and the traditionalist and religious right opportunistically took maximalist positions that either
pushed for rapid change or sought to foreclose all change. Id. at 9–10. Rauch’s version of Burkeanism
would favor incrementalism in the recognition of gay marriage, with civil union an important
intermediate step. Id. at 11–12. See also Amy L. Wax, The Conservative’s Dilemma: Traditional
Institutions, Social Change, and Same-Sex Marriage, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1059 (2005). Wax asks
whether conservatives should resist same-sex marriage. Id. at 1097. Referring in part to a book-length
argument by Jonathan Rauch, id. at 1098–1103 and to the indisputable fact that forms of family life are
193
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way that religion sometimes, as a type of ideology, naturalizes and
stabilizes currently existing social structures, takes us too far afield from
the topic of the Article, and must await another occasion.
C. Introducing New Names into Practice
Thus far in our consideration of names and identities, we have
examined inherited family names and the way in which they fixed the
identities of Romeo and Juliet; and a general theory of interpellation in
which inherited language, culture, and other social structures call out to
and in part fix, indeed establish, individual subjects, even as those subjects
produce the rituals and practices that establish them. Although we
eventually will circle back towards the topic of this Article—the harm in
establishing the name “civil union” as compared to the name “marriage”
—I want to explore briefly here another theme that will also shed some
light on the stakes in the name distinction. That is the attempt to alter
identity-conferring and -confirming names (that is, one category of names
that interpellate) by replacing them. Where the names are not family
names (e.g., Montague and Capulet) but words and customs used in a
particular language for identities and social structures, an act of
“interpellative advocacy”197 that attempts to change the implications of
identity often involves seeking to introduce new names into a very
widespread everyday practice. This is not so easy to do; one cannot
change a language, or any other widespread and diffuse social practice, by
simple fiat.198 And yet when addressing a stigma or subordination that is
produced and maintained in part by naming practices, the activity of name
changing may be called for.
One kind of name-changing process might involve seeking to erase
and replace stigmatizing names for subordinated groups. “Nigger” goes to
“Negro” goes to “Afro-American” goes to “black” goes to “Black” goes to
“African American.” “Faggot/fairy/dyke” goes to “homosexual” goes to
“gay and lesbian” goes perhaps to “queer” and perhaps also to mentioning
“bisexual” and “transgender” instead of erasing them.199 There are other

changing, id. at 1101–03, Wax concludes that the answer remains elusive. Id. at 1103 (discussing
JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD
FOR AMERICA (2004)).
197
Gabilondo, supra note 178, at 3.
198
Robin Tolmach Lakoff, Language and Woman’s Place, in ROBIN TOLMACH LAKOFF,
LANGUAGE AND WOMAN’S PLACE: TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 29, 68 (Mary Bucholtz ed., rev. &
expanded ed. 2004) (reproducing with commentaries Robin Lakoff’s important 1975 book Language
and Women’s Place) (“[S]ocial change must precede lexical change: woman must achieve some
measure of greater social independence of men before Ms. can gain wider acceptance.”).
199
For an account of several such attempts to engineer social positioning through changing the
names for stigmatized groups, see Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage: Language and
Status in Family Law, 85 INDIANA L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
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examples. These processes are complex and occur on many levels, just as
does the feminist name- and word-replacing project I will consider in this
subpart. In each individual interaction that might call for the old name,
once the participant(s) are aware of their new choices, they will have to
consider more deliberately what name to use. They will have to stop and
think. Indeed, for those seeking to get the naming practice changed, part of
the purpose is to “raise consciousness” of those who have unthinkingly
used names that carried and reproduced insult and subordination.200
In some cases, the traces of stigmatized identity lurk in many places
within a language and related social practices, and a progressive critique
and name replacement project needs to hunt them out quite broadly.201 The
feminist critique of language is an example. Beginning at least as early as
the 1970s and continuing to this day, feminists have examined and
challenged a number of ways in which accepted words, proper naming
practices, and forms of address reflected and perpetuated gender
stereotypes.202 Precisely because of the apparent transparency and
objectivity of language and related social interactions, the stereotypes
produced by linguistic usages and simultaneously reproducing these usages
then to retain their legitimacy; the naming practices that perpetuate them
appear to be neutral or at most of trivial import. Feminists have made a
significant effort to identify and reform these seemingly trivial gendered
usages.
Some of this effort has involved theoretical work and
consciousness-raising within the feminist movement, some has involved
legal changes of various kinds. Much of this work has occurred in
individual interactions and confrontations. I will never forget the
vehement challenge of a graduate student when a professor addressed her
as “Miss” in a seminar at Yale in 1973. She wanted to be addressed as
=1351133. On failure to mention bisexuality in discussions of gay men and lesbians, see generally
Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000).
200
Rusty Barrett, As Much As We Use Language: Lakoff’s Queer Augury, in LAKOFF, supra note
198, at 296, 301 (“Although language change does not create social change, the examination of
inequalities in language structure may become an important tool in struggles for social change by
stimulating symbolic discussions of social injustice.”). As an opponent of the feminist language project
fulminates, “Women’s Lib is succeeding in making everybody self-conscious about his use of
language.” Michael Levin, Vs. Ms., in SEX EQUALITY 216, 217 (Jane English ed., 1974). Levin
considers the feminist language project an “imposition on our thinking process.” Id. Well, yes.
Levin’s viewpoint is discussed infra.
201
See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, Gender Stereotypes at Work, 65 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1073, 1086–90
(1999) [hereinafter Poirier, Gender Stereotypes] (discussing gender schemata).
202
See generally LAKOFF, supra note 198; Pat K. Chew & Lauren K. Kelley-Chew, Subtly Sexist
Language, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 643 (2007) (documenting and critiquing the continuing use of
male-gendered pronouns in legal discourse); Emens, supra note 133; Kim, supra note 199; Omi
[Morgenstern Leissner], The Problem That Has No Name, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 321 (1997–
1998). The author Omi uses only her/his first name in the title, disclosing surnames in the asterisk
footnote. Id. at 321 n.*. Ironically, I cannot even tell which pronoun, “he” or “she”, to use in this
footnote, as this Israeli given name does not convey gender to me, a non-Hebrew speaker, and English
requires third person singular pronouns to correspond to the sex/gender of the persons referred to. No
name indeed.
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“Ms.”
The feminist critique of language has addressed many different kinds
of words and naming practices, including “girl”/“woman”, gender-tags on
names for occupations and other social categories, the loss of women’s
surnames at marriage, the conferral of the father’s surname rather than the
mother’s on children, the gendering of given names, and in more recent
times various naming practices involving same-sex couples and their
children. The “Miss”/“Mrs.”/“Ms.” controversy that I explore briefly
below is only one. I am confident that an exploration of the decades of
feminist literature on names, gendered words, and related social practices
would shed more light on the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction than I
have the resources to do here.
There are many levels to naming practices. Individual uses of a name,
form of address, or gendered word are of course also instantiations of that
word in a language. They are small and specific microperformances and
broader social habits at the same time.203 Moreover, insofar as they are
shared (which they must be to be understood), they may well become
ritualized, for example in forms of address, such as “Mr.”/“Mrs.”/“Miss.”
Ritualized practices of naming may in turn be embedded in various spheres
of interaction—a specific school, church, union, or ethnic community, for
example.204 The naming practices are also likely to be fixed and authorized
in dictionaries and, if a cultural policing organization exists, in the decrees
of something like the Académie Française.205 Some naming practices may
be expected or required on forms and on their modern avatar, computerized
forms.206 They may also be reinforced by what Elizabeth Emens has
cogently called “desk-clerk law.”207
203
As I have argued, “A ‘language’ does not exist (except as an abstraction) apart from a very
large series of individual acts and practices. There is no higher entity that ‘sources’ or ‘authorizes’ one
particular language for all of us.” Poirier, Gender Stereotypes, supra note 201, at 1107.
204
The astute reader may notice that my insistence on the primacy of local and specific instances
of language and of naming practices is remarkably similar to the often-missed point that Althusser
grounds his account of ideology in specific individuals’ specific rituals within specific practices and
specific civic institutions (a.k.a. Ideological State Apparatuses).
205
See Poirier, Gender Stereotypes, supra note 201, at 1112 (discussing the Académie Française
as a political referee of linguistic usage).
206
For example, I might have to supply one of a limited set of honorifics, or a first and last name,
or only one and not two last names, on a computerized form in order for it to be accepted by the
computer program. Kerry Abrams recently described to me in conversation how a computerized form
categorically refused to accept hyphenated last names such as those of her children, so that she could
not buy airline tickets for them that showed their legal names. In an insightful article on the marriage
controversy as a question of language, Mae Kuykendall describes the cultural importance of forms.
“Printed forms continually reinforce the significance of the marriage status, while communicating a
deceptive simplicity and uniformity relating to the underlying marital narratives.” Mae Kuykendall,
Resistance to Same-Sex Marriage as a Story about Language: Linguistic Failure and the Priority of a
Living Language, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 416–17 (1999) [hereinafter Kuykendall,
Resistance]. Kuykendall describes forms as a kind of coerced speech with a set vocabulary. Id. at 417.
207
See Emens, supra note 133, at 824–27 (describing resistance by low-level functionaries to
legal but socially untraditional naming choices). Desk-clerk law occurs “not through any official grant
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One particularly significant kind of fixity involves legally required
names. These take considerable effort to establish through a legislative or
regulatory process,208 and then subsequently to expunge through a similar
process. Also, once established, they become embedded in those printed
and computerized forms, which are costly to alter. As for getting clerks to
change their ways once they have learned a set of rules, that may be even
more complicated. Legally recognizing certain identity names establishes
them, to the detriment of alternatives that might be brought forward in
practice. The alternatives will not be used as often and will suffer by
comparison to the official recognition of the preferred name, form, address,
etc. Occasionally there may be consequences to improperly filling out
forms with unauthorized names and titles, as in the case we are about to
consider. And last but not least, when a naming practice is legally
authorized, that authorization confers legitimacy on the name. The name is
either permitted or required by the state, and therefore those who read ill
into the name and naming practice have a more difficult argument to make
in all those others spheres of social interaction—theoretical discussion,
within-group discourse, and individual interactions of all types.
It is with this set of concerns in mind that we approach, briefly, the
feminist attempt to challenge the practice and expectation that adult
women would be addressed as “Miss” if unmarried and “Mrs.” if married.
Feminists offered a neologism, “Ms.”, which continued the gender
differentiation from “Mr.” (unlike for example “Comrade” in certain
societies in certain languages209 at certain times) but no longer specified
women’s marital status.210 In one jurisdiction the issue got to court. At the
time of Allyn v. Allison,211 California required women who desired to
register to vote to designate themselves as either “Miss” or “Mrs.” There
was no opting out. There existed no parallel requirement for men. Indeed,
the forms of address in English did not make such a distinction for men.
of discretion, but through . . . ignorance, impatience, or normative views.” Id. at 810. Cf. Dan M.
Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607,
607 (2000) (describing as “the sticky norms problem” deliberate resistance to carrying out changes in a
law intended to change a social norm when decision makers disagree with the change).
208
For example, Robin Lakoff reports that Representative Bella Abzug and others introduced a
bill in Congress to abolish “Mrs.” and “Miss” in favor of “Ms.,” but it failed. Lakoff, supra note 198,
at 64.
209
I am thinking of languages that do not have masculine and feminine grammatical forms, which
likely would be expected to correlate with the gender of the person addressed. In a language with
masculine and feminine forms I’m not sure one could get away from gender in forms of address.
210
See, e.g., Lakoff, supra note 198, at 64, 67–69. All three forms—“Mrs.,” “Miss,” and “Ms.”—
are contractions of “mistress”. “Ms.” was used sporadically as early as the 1700s. Its modern use in
preference to other appellations originated in 1961. Wikipedia, Ms., available at http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Ms. (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
211
Allyn v. Allison, 110 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Cal. App. 1973). Although Shepard’s does not provide
any indication of further history to the case, I take the notation at the end of the Allyn opinion to mean
that the California Supreme Court denied certiorari, since three Justices of that court dissented from a
denial of a hearing. Id. at 81.
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Two women sought to register to vote as “Ms.” Their applications
were denied. They sought a writ of mandamus. The trial court granted the
state’s demurrer. An appeal ensued. The appellants argued that requiring
them to designate themselves “Miss” or “Mrs.” required them to disclose
marital status, which was (1) unnecessary to ensure accurate voter
representation, thus a violation of the statute’s provisions for voter
registration; (2) a burden imposed on women but not men, thus a violation
of equal protection; and (3) a burden on women’s right to vote pursuant to
the Nineteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.212
The court rejected these challenges. Justice Compton accepted the
state’s argument that the indication of “Mrs.” would tell the state that the
applicant was or had been married, and thus might have previously been
registered under a different name.213 So the requirement plausibly helped
to prevent voter registration fraud. At that time, a woman married in
California was expected or perhaps required to change her surname to that
of her husband.214 Even though another requirement, the listing of all prior
registrations, might have achieved the same objective, Justice Compton
held that the court would not inquire into whether the agency’s method was
the best one, so long as the justification it proffered was a reasonable
one.215 Nor was the incidental disclosure of marital status for women
found to be in any way burdensome, especially since marital status was in
no way private; indeed marital status was a matter of public record.216
Presiding Justice Roth, concurring, acknowledged that the challenged
statutory section “without apparent solid reason, seeks and requires
specific information from female voter registrants in respect of marital
status which males are not required to give.”217 Nevertheless, Justice Roth
did not discern any injury from the practice, even though it was of long
standing. The “discrimination [was] so trivial”218 that “even though it
could be probably whipped and beaten into constitutional proportions”219
he was inclined to allow the legislature to address the issue first.220 As
212

Id. at 78.
Id. at 79–80.
214
Id. at 80. But cf. Kenneth L. Karst, “A Discrimination So Trivial”: A Note on Law and the
Symbolism of Women’s Dependency, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 546, 547 n.5 (1974) [hereinafter Karst, “A
Discrimination so Trivial”] (discussing the common law of name changing upon marriage and whether
it applied in California at the time of the Allyn opinion).
215
Allyn, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 79–80.
216
Id. at 80.
217
Id. at 80 (Roth, J., concurring). He pointed out that driver’s license applications requested
marital status for both sexes, directly, rather than relying on women’s honorific. Id. He also noted that
although the voter registration statute required social security numbers and phone numbers, voter
registration would not be denied if that information was withheld, in contrast to the unwaivable
requirement that “Miss” or “Mrs.” be provided in order for a woman to register. Id. at 81.
218
Id. at 80.
219
Id.
220
Id. at 80–81.
213
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Kenneth Karst’s consideration of the case points out, the Equal Rights
Amendment was in the air,221 and in any event the California legislature
repealed the “Miss”/ “Mrs.” provision the following year.222
Justice Fleming’s brief concurrence pointed out that the usages of
women’s honorific titles had shifted over time223 and that in fact the
plaintiffs were free to call themselves either ”Miss” or “Mrs.”, just not a
third term such as “Ms.”224 Kenneth Karst characterizes the tone of this
concurrence as humorous.225
Professor Karst provides a helpful place to start in analyzing Allyn. He
focuses on the tension between what seems a trivial matter and the
weightier symbolic injury behind it.226 Karst writes that “the justices
thought they were dealing with a constitutional trifle” and thus failed to
take it seriously.227 Karst argues that the injury complained of (1) is not
paltry and (2) should not have been left to the legislature to remedy or
not.228 By requiring women to disclose marital status (more or less) before
registering to vote, the state embedded in the voter registration process a
symbolic acknowledgement of women’s historical dependency upon
men.229 The “Miss”/“Mrs.” requirement was an affront to women’s
dignity; it could have wide-ranging consequences,230 and would in
particular be psychologically debilitating.231 Karst argued that “one’s selfperception is enormously influential in determining choices”232—especially
major life choices. In telling women that a facet of their personal life
symbolic of their past dependency still mattered to the state and had to be
disclosed before they could vote, the “Miss”/“Mrs.” requirement denied
them their right to “first-class citizenship”.233 This injury was in fact of
constitutional scope, because in Karst’s view the Fourteenth Amendment’s
equal protection guarantee is first and foremost about the dignity of
221

Karst, “A Discrimination So Trivial,” supra note 214, at 555–57.
Id. at 546–47 & n.4, 554.
223
Allyn v. Allison, 110 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (Fleming, J., concurring).
224
Id.
225
Karst, “A Discrimination So Trivial,” supra note 214, at 548 (describing Justice Fleming’s
opinions as having “a wink here or a knowing chuckle there.”).
226
Id. at 546.
227
Id.
228
Id. at 549. Karst points out that the California Supreme Court had already held sex, like race,
to be a suspect class. Id. at 550 & n.14 (citing Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971)).
229
Karst discerned women’s dependency on men to be a central issue of the women’s movement,
as it was emerging in the 1970s time frame. Id. at 552 & n.26.
230
Id. at 551.
231
Id. at 550 (“Once a certain subsistence level is attained, what really matters about inequality is
something that happens inside our heads . . . .”).
232
Id. at 551. Karst writes, “[T]he most destructive dependency of all is psychological, the
dependency that limits a woman’s sense of who she is and what she can do.” Id. at 552.
233
Id. at 553. It did not matter that many or most women might still choose to use “Miss” or
“Mrs.” Id. Making “Ms.” available would provide the ability for women to send a different message
about themselves. Id. at 552 n.26. It opened other possibilities for women’s self-definition. Id.
222
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234

citizenship.
The judicial approval of the legislature’s “Miss”/“Mrs.”
requirement was “particularly destructive,”235 and the opinion’s tone of
triviality and levity only added insult to injury.236
In a footnote, Karst observes that “The title ‘Ms.’ is designed . . . both
for the woman’s own consumption and for the edification of the outside
world[.]”237 In designating herself “Ms.” a woman sends a message that
she does not wish to be defined by marital status, and calls into question a
world view that makes that important.238 This footnote contains a germ of
the insight that the appellations “Miss”, “Mrs.”, and “Ms.” constitute the
woman and those who interpret her, and that at stake is the choice about
how to present oneself in the face of a subordinating naming tradition.
(“Ms.” is for all that not so neutral; it carries its own message, but a
different one.)239 Using a term discussed earlier, in the consideration of
Althusser, insisting on “Ms.” is a kind of “interpellative advocacy”.240
The “Miss”/“Mrs.” distinction is not just about women’s dependency,
at least in some people’s view, but is specifically about recognizing the
different sexual roles of men and women, and indicating the sexual
availability of women. Michael Levin, for example, offers an evolutionary
biology justification of “Miss”/“Mrs.”: it is necessary to facilitate the
genetic variety that is accomplished by sexual intercourse.241 Man is the
natural “aggressor,”242 Levin argues, and the distinction
signals the male immediately as to the potentials for his
future relations with [a] new female. The possibility of
sexual awareness always exists between man and woman,
and Miss/Mrs. is one of the many ways of accommodating
234

Id. Karst’s expansive view of equal citizenship under the fourteenth amendment was
expressed at length in an important article a short time later. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship,
supra note 36. Moreover Karst wrote in anticipation of the adoption of the federal Equal Rights
Amendment, which would have granted women equal rights under law in broad terms, parallel to the
fourteenth amendment’s provision of equal rights for all races. Karst, “A Discrimination So Trivial,”
supra note 214, at 555–57.
235
Karst, “A Discrimination So Trivial,” supra note 214, at 552.
236
Id. at 553.
237
Id. at 552 n.26.
238
Id. (quoting B. Sonka, Language, Self-Concept, and Social Change (1973) (unpublished
manuscript)).
239
Cf. Emens, supra note 133, at 766–67 (arguing that none of the choices women face in
deciding what to do with their surname upon marriage is particularly good, and that any choice will
elicit disapproval from someone). I would also point out that the fact that men have only one honorific,
“Mr.”, does not mean “Mr.” is neutral. Instead, the fact that “Mr.” is not expected to change upon a
man’s marriage reflects a particular position about male identity vis-à-vis marriage. If “Mr.” seems
neutral, that is because it is transparent, in the sense Barbara Flagg uses the word to describe
interactions whose structure of dominance and subordination is masked and appears natural. See Flagg,
supra note 193.
240
See supra notes 178–79and accompanying text (noting that Gabilondo coined the term
“interpellative advocacy”).
241
Levin, supra note 200, at 200.
242
Id.
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this. . . . Miss/Mrs. has come about through its evolutionary
value and consilience with human nature.243
So this is the “spontaneity” that would be destroyed by self-consciousness
about sexism in language!244 No wonder Levin objects to the way the
feminist critique of language would interfere with his communication.
Shades of Catharine MacKinnon!
I find Levin’s interpretation of “Miss”/“Mrs.” obnoxious, as well as
degrading to women. What ought the state to do, faced with an
interpretation such as Levin’s? If his interpretation is anomalous, held
only by an outlier here and there, then it could be ignored. If it is
widespread it might need to be addressed. But how? The state can hardly
go in and legislate and enforce different usages in all the realms and
instances where honorifics are deployed.245 However, one place where the
state does have control is in official requirements, such as the voter
registration law at issue in Allyn v. Allison.246 Here the state might note that
in perpetuating the distinction, and in giving it legitimacy by making its
use a prerequisite to voter registration, the state gives credence to the fact
that the “Miss”/ “Mrs.” distinction must mean something—that it is in fact
not so trivial a distinction. And where an interpretation as obnoxious as
Levin’s of a linguistic usage is likely widely held, the state might well
decide to move from requiring that usage to at least making it an optional,
personal decision, not only enhancing individual choice, but removing the
imprimatur for potentially obnoxious and harmful interpretations of
identity due to the state’s linguistic endorsement of a particular naming
practice. Further change could then be addressed in non-legal spheres, via
a social dialogue over a period of time.247
243

Id. at 219.
Id.
This point was acknowledged by Robin Lakoff. Lakoff, supra note 198, at 68. When
language reflects a social practice, a good deal of social change has to occur before one can expect the
law to change, and in any event the law will not be the prime source of change. Id.
246
Allyn v. Allison, 110 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
247
In their considerations of marital naming practices, both Elizabeth Emens and Suzanne Kim
observe that despite the removal of any legal constraints, the behavior of men and women around
surname change upon marriage is quite different, suggesting that in this area of social naming practice
the constraints are primarily social and not legal. Emens, supra note 133, at 763 (suggesting that social
convention rather than law is driving behavior, at least for women); Kim, supra note 199, text before
note 150 (arguing that social forces construct women’s name-changing options, and that women are
operating within a structure of gender hierarchy that initially limits women’s choices). The constraints
around names for same-sex couples are similar.
As Jack Balkin points out, “Large-scale changes in social structure require social transformation
over long periods of time, and law forms only a part of that phenomenon.” J.M. Balkin, The
Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2315 (1997). But this observation does not mean that
change in the direction of equality and autonomy is unavailable. Speaking generally, Robert Leckey
observes that “Social conduct and cultural forces not characterizable as direct emanations of the state . .
. limit the freedoms associated with liberal constitutional democracies.” Leckey, supra note 14, at 457.
There is a “discriminatory remainder that survives change” and is “beyond the purview of
constitutional law.” Id. at 458. Nevertheless, referring to Kenji Yoshino’s important work on
244
245
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Moreover, in considering what to do about an obnoxious and harmful
interpretation of a linguistic usage, the state ought to take into account its
history. The “Miss”/“Mrs.” distinction was not on the books by accident.
It likely reflected the worldview that Mr. Levin articulated, once more
widely held than in the 1970s, but undoubtedly persisting—if somewhat
muted—given the short time frame in which the background culture
around sex/gender had begun to change. Thus both the history of the
“Miss”/“Mrs.” distinction and the possibility that continuing to require it
legally would encourage the continuation of obnoxious and harmful
understandings of it are relevant. Conversely, derequiring the usage might
in fact force Mr. Levin and his ilk to do what they do not want to do, viz.,
consider what lies behind their transparent choice of words. And it would
certainly also send a message to and empower those who otherwise might
be demoralized by the state’s endorsement of the distinction, as Karst
points out.
Let us take a moment now to compare the “Miss”/“Mrs.”/“Ms.”
distinction to the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction. In both, progressive
forces seek to squelch the official recognition of a set of terms that forces a
distinction (“Miss”/“Mrs.” or “civil union”/“marriage”) in favor of a term
that obscures the underlying social fact highlighted by the distinction
(“Ms.” for all women regardless of marital status, and “marriage” or some
as-yet-undeveloped name for all legally recognized couples and their
families regardless of the sex of the members of the couple). The
underlying social movement is unlikely to succeed in replacing the old
terms altogether in a short or intermediate time frame. But legally derequiring the naming distinction makes it more often possible legally and
socially to deploy the more inclusive usage, facilitates personal choice
about how to present oneself, and slowly allows change in the diffuse
social naming practices that might otherwise function to reproduce the
distinction. Moreover, both distinctions are harmful in significant part
because of their history, which deployed, reflected, and reinforced
stereotypes and related prejudices and dominant/subordinate relationships
in ways which the unexamined naming practices helped to naturalize.
There are differences, to be sure. In the one case “Ms.,” the
neologism, is preferred. In the other, “civil union,” the neologism, is
attacked. It is attacked because it perpetuates the distinction, while the
new word “Ms.” obscures a distinction perpetuated by “Mrs.”/“Miss”.
We should proceed carefully here. State recognition of “civil union” is
covering, Leckey argues that social change ultimately is forwarded by “conversations” that “force the
demands made of members of minorities groups to come into view.” Id. (discussing KENJI YOSHINO,
COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 193–95 (2006)). That “conversation”
strategy is being explicitly implemented by marriage equality groups and by LGBTQ groups more
generally. See infra Part III.D. And changes in the law around names for families can free up the
possibility of those conversations.
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in significant respects an advance over no legal recognition and no name.
Indeed, in many parts of the country, a local or state legal recognition of a
same-sex relationship even with a different name would be significant
progress for marriage equality and for the GLBTQ movement generally. If
one were to average out the country as a whole instead of determining the
issue state by state, “civil union,” or some such novel terminology for the
legal recognition of same-sex couples, while retaining the name of
“marriage” for different-sex couples, might well be the current point of
dynamic equilibrium. But we are talking about Connecticut here. And in
Connecticut—which is the social background community relevant to the
naming practices at issue in the Kerrigan case248—“civil union” can be
understood to do more harm than good. “Civil union” represents progress
compared to no name, but retards progress when compared to “marriage”
in a state where the partial recognition of GLBTQ normal status, marked
and forwarded by civil union, is already well underway.
The “Miss”/“Mrs.”/“Ms.” comparison also serves to remind us that one
might seek to defuse the cultural tension over “marriage” and same-sex
couples by getting rid of legal endorsement for marriage altogether, having
states grant the benefits and confer the responsibilities on same-sex and
different-sex couples alike, but with a different term altogether.249 Former
Vermont Chief Justice Amestoy, for example, has proposed “marriage
unions.”250 This new third term would correspond to the feminist “Ms.”
Such a change in terminology is unlikely, however. The partisans on both
248
Doctrinally, one might link this assertion of the relevance of local social context to the Geisler
factors invoked and considered by the Kerrigan court, especially the sixth factor. See Kerrigan v.
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 421 (Conn. 2008) (listing six additional factors to be considered
when construing the state constitution; the sixth of the Geisler factors is “contemporary economic and
sociological considerations, including relevant public policies”) (citing State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225,
1232 (Conn. 1992)). The portion of the Kerrigan opinion that applies the sixth Geisler factor addresses
four points, including the fact that marriage is an elevated and central status while civil union is novel,
and that there is a history of discrimination against gay persons against which the distinction must be
read. Id. at 474–75. As in the earlier portion of the opinion on cognizable injury, much of the court’s
reasoning here is lengthy direct quotations, from In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) and
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003).
249
Proposals to this effect seem to be increasingly common. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter,
“Defending” Marriage: A Modest Proposal, 41 HOW. L.J. 215, 216 (1998) (recommending exploration
of the question why the state is in the marriage business at all); Stephanie Coontz, Taking Marriage
Private, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2007, at A23, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File
(recommending that we leave churches to “decide what marriages they deem ‘licit,’” but allow both
gay and straight couples access to “the legal protections and obligations of a committed relationship”);
Poirier, Cultural Property, supra note 4, at 411–14 (discussing the potential merits of disestablishment,
whereby states would relinquish control over marriage altogether and “would no longer marry
anyone”); Edward A Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil
Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2006) (opining that “it is time to abolish civil marriage,”
and that marriage “should become solely a religious and cultural institution with no legal definition or
status”).
250
Jeff Amestoy, Ending the Gay-Marriage War: California’s Ruling May Point Toward
‘Marriage Unions’ as a Solution, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 22, 2008, at 9, available at LEXIS,
News Library, CSM File.
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sides of the marriage controversy seek to retain the word “marriage”
precisely because of all its history and connotations. Neither traditionalists
nor marriage equality advocates would willingly let it go as part of a
compromise. Indeed, the point is made in the hypothetical that finds its
way into the Kerrigan opinion: would married couples willingly accept
that their relationships be denominated “civil unions?”251 For most married
couples, the answer is clearly not.252
D. Naming Practices and Questions of Scale: The Local, the Universal,
the Social, the Legal, Storytelling, and Change from the Bottom Up
In order to appreciate the mechanism of the harm of the “civil
union”/“marriage” distinction, we must keep in mind that larger structures
of discrimination and stigmatizing social identification do not exist
separately from the microinteractions that are produced by them and that
reproduce and reinscribe them. Status and identity here, as always, must
be thought through from the bottom up.
I will let Kenneth Karst introduce this issue. He writes in Local
Discourse and the Social Issues253 that while we may engage important
social issues at larger levels, through attempts at universal discourse and in
the mass media, “[T]he life of every individual citizen goes on here and
now—in the ‘here’ of home, neighborhood, social circle, religious
congregation, work, or school; in the ‘now’ of day-to-day activities that
provide continuous streams of talk and meaning-laden behavior.”254 Karst
calls this stream of communicative interaction “local discourse.”255 He
specifically identifies several arenas of local discourse: household, friends,
and relations;256 schools;257 the religious congregation;258 and the
workplace.259 Sounds like Althusser.
Karst emphasizes that local discourse is “a powerful source of belief
and conduct,”260 and moreover “behavior shapes meanings (as well as
reflects them).”261 He stresses this point: behavior “is not just a reaction to
speech: behavior has its own acculturating—causal—consequences for
speech and for further action: ‘people act themselves into a way of

251

Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 417 n.14.
Id.
Kenneth L. Karst, Local Discourse and the Social Issues, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 1
(2000) [hereinafter Karst, Local Discourse].
254
Id. at 2.
255
Id.
256
Id. at 5–7.
257
Id. at 7–9.
258
Id. at 9–10.
259
Id. at 10–11.
260
Id. at 2–3.
261
Id. at 3.
252
253
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believing as readily as they believe themselves into a way of acting.’”262 It
is not wholly accurate to say that culture is the assignment of meaning to
behavior; behavior “has its own role in creating, reinforcing, or
undermining meanings.”263
Local discourse “leads us to believe not only in the identity labels we
apply to ourselves, but also in those we apply to others.”264 Local
discourse “is particularly influential on self-definition, and thus on the
formation of perceptions and beliefs about gender, about race, and about
religion. So both local discourse-as-talk and discourse-as-behavior have
powerful implications for the politics and the law of the social issues.”265
At other points in the essay Karst adds sexual orientation to this list,266 and
he examines the local workings of behavior around sexual orientation and
local discourse.267 Coming out, for example, can be understood as a
process of local discourse: when George comes out to Bob, “George’s
whole life becomes part of the local discourse that adds to Bob’s
acculturation” and affects his mental image of gay people.268 Moreover,
when this happens millions of times on the local level, “local discourse is
well on its way to deciding another of the social issues.”269
How can we understand the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction in the
Connecticut Civil Union Act as it addresses and affects local practice? The
act is an intervention, made possible by several decades of progressive
moves towards recognition of gay and lesbian individuals and couples in
Connecticut (and elsewhere) individually piecemeal and then in larger
doctrinal leaps. In offering the name “civil union” along with the rights
and responsibilities equivalent to marriage, the Act does move forward,
bestowing an official name and an official recognition on same-sex
couples, where they had not had one before. It moves beyond tolerance
and beyond a limited recognition in those specific instances where a couple
provides a sufficiently compelling performance, as assessed by reference to
an idealized heterosexual married couple.270
262

Id. at 13 (quoting JEROME BRUNER: ON KNOWING: ESSAYS FOR THE LEFT HAND 132–33

(1979)).
263

Id. at 24.
Id. at 12.
265
Id. at 3. Karst expands on the way in which local discourse creates and recreates group
identities. Id. at 12–13.
266
Id. at 12 (including sexual orientation in the list along with race, gender, and religion).
267
Id. at 21–23 (discussing the powerful community-forming influence of the Stonewall Riot in
1969 and of gay bars throughout the 1960s).
268
Id. at 23.
269
Id.
270
See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale Approaches Towards Marriage Equality
in New Jersey: Is Lewis v. Harris a Dead End or Just a Detour?, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 291, 308–10,
318–20, 347–48 (2007) [hereinafter Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale] (explaining first the beginnings
of the functional equivalence doctrine in New Jersey, and subsequently the New Jersey Domestic
Partnership Act, which followed the initiation of the Lewis v. Harris litigation).
264
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But at the same time it withholds another name, “marriage,” and all its
correlated kinship words and ceremonial words and practices. Same-sex
couples may still get “married” and have “weddings” and call themselves
“husbands” or “wives,” but the state has made the official and public
statement that that set of words is social only, and not official. In a society
where civil recognition of the state carries such weight, this statement
maintains a distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex couples in the
law, even as it confers legal rights, benefits, and responsibilities on samesex couples. This distinction is reflected in the name distinction.
Much of my own work in the gender area has insisted on always
keeping in mind the ways in which the issues of the sex/gender
Kulturkampf are local, specific, and material, as well as more abstract,
legal, and sometimes argued about in universal categories.271 In one recent
formulation, I called this “asking the place/space question,” in homage to
Katharine Bartlett’s formulation of feminist inquiry as “asking the woman
question.”272 The place/space question will typically allow us “to develop
a tiered description of the praxis of challenging various exclusions that
create and maintain a sense of second-class citizenship.”273
In the context of the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction, two of my
articles are particularly relevant. Ten years ago, in Gender Stereotyping at
271

For more detailed analysis of this issue, see Marc R. Poirier, Microperformances of Identity:
Visible Same-Sex Couples and the Marriage Controversy, 15 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 3
(2008) [hereinafter Poirier, Microperformances of Identity] (applying some of the insights of Erving
Goffman, Joseph Gusfield, Kenji Yoshino, and Judith Butler to the ways in which visible
microperformances of same-sex couples as couples trouble traditional notions of marriage and family);
Marc R. Poirier, Gender, Place, Discursive Space: Where Is Same-Sex Marriage?, 3 FLA. INT’L U. L.
REV 307, 317–34 (2008) [hereinafter Poirier, Gender, Place] (answering the “Where is same-sex
marriage?” question in terms of territorial legal jurisdiction, aterritorial communities of shared
meaning, metonymic conflicts where a small performance invokes larger concepts, and everyday
interactions); Marc R. Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, Identity Processes, and the Kulturkampf: Why
Federalism Is Not the Main Event, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 387, 387–92 (2008) [hereinafter
Poirier, Identity Processes] (arguing that the contemporary Kulturkampf over sex, gender, sexual
orientation, marriage, and family occurs primarily at the level of local interaction and at the level of
large discursive space, so that the state-by-state patchwork of different rules is incidental rather than
central to an appreciation of the controversy); Poirier, Cultural Property, supra note 4, at 359–401
(analyzing the traditionalist sense of injury from same-sex marriage both in terms of the institution’s
meaning and in the everyday visible practices of same-sex couples as married couples); Poirier,
Piecemeal and Wholesale, supra note 270 (analyzing the progress towards marriage equality in New
Jersey in terms of the transgressive visibility of gay men and lesbians first as individuals and then as
couples; this visibility eventually facilitated claims of legal rights, first piecemeal and then wholesale);
Poirier, Hastening, supra note 194, at 271 (analyzing the conflicts of openly gay men serving in the
Boy Scouts in terms of an attempt to control adult role models of masculinity in everyday interactions,
to prevent boys from being influenced by sissies); Poirier, Cognitive Bias, supra note 13, at 459
(analyzing discrimination in the workplace in terms of specific interactions that are caused by and
reproducing unconscious biases; and arguing that intent is irrelevant to liability, on the model of
liability for dangerous natural conditions).
272
Poirier, Gender, Place, supra note 271, at 334–35 (discussing Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist
Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 831, 837–49 (1990) (arguing that repeatedly “asking the
woman question” becomes a method that furthers important feminist political goals)).
273
Id. at 338.
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274

Work, I undertook a broad description of the workings of categorization
and stereotyping at the micro level, relying on earlier and germinal work in
the field of cognitive bias.275 I suggested that important social categories
were tagged for gender, and that everyday processes of recognition
implemented
unconscious
gender
stereotypes,
simultaneously
(re)producing important social categories and the practices and experiences
of dominance and subordination.276 I argued that this “system of social
categories constitutes a rich feedback system that will tend to maintain
itself in homeostasis.”277 This homeostatic process involved an ongoing
interplay between (1) real world instances of the social categories and each
individual’s specific cognitive version of the categories; (2) among each
individual’s mutually reinforcing cognitively-held categories; and (3)
among different mutually-reinforcing real-world exemplars of the
cognitive categories.278 These interlocking micropractices form “a truly
diffuse system of unconscious prejudice. . . . which is not intentionally
reformed easily over a short period of time.”279
I suggested that this analysis of gender schemas as they occur in
practice paralleled similar analyses of ideology and language: all are
diffuse systems of social interaction, all rely on representation, all produce
systems of dominance and subordination, and all share similar homeostatic
processes and are therefore difficult to change.280 Martha Fineman, whom
I relied on extensively in this section of that article, provides a helpful
summary. She writes, “One way to understand the concept of ideology is
to consider it as an information processing system. An ideology is
constituted by a complementary collection of symbols, beliefs, and
assumptions that, in combination, rationalize and give meaning to
274
Poirier, Gender Stereotypes, supra note 201, at 1073–79. This article was part of a symposium
panel on VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN (1998), and in particular
developed Dr. Valian’s discussion of gender schemas.
275
For some classic analyses of this issue, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, supra note 131. The social science literature
on implicit bias grows apace, as does the legal academic literature seeking to apply it. Basically, at this
juncture, “[t]here is . . . overwhelming evidence that mental constructs that are cognitively accessible
influence how the perceiver evaluates and judges others.” Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair
Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action”, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1083 (2006).
Samuel Bagenstos responds to critics of the science of implicit bias by arguing that their criticism is
really not about the science, but instead about what the goal of antidiscrimination law should be.
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
477, 479–80 (2007).
276
Poirier, Gender Stereotypes, supra note 201, at 1086–90; cf. Steven L. Winter, The “Power”
Thing, 82 VA. L. REV. 721, 805–09 (1996) (discussing the diffuse replication of gender roles).
277
Poirier, Gender Stereotypes, supra note 201, at 1101.
278
Id. at 1101–06.
279
Id. at 1106. We should contrast the essentially unconscious homeostatic process that I
described with the deliberate undermining of legislative change, which Dan Kahan described as the
“sticky norms” problem. See Kahan, supra note 207.
280
Poirier, Gender Stereotypes, supra note 201, at 1106–13.
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Moreover,

[D]ominant ideology is more likely to operate as a
conservative force, serving to tame or domesticate discourses
by exerting a confining pressure on their initial development,
ultimately channeling even the most radical ideas into
categories approved by the existing conceptual system. . . .
Dominant ideologies are subtly and conclusively expressed
and repressed in the very creation and recreation of social
norms and conventions. . . . A dominant ideology is
transmitted through everyday discourse—through language,
symbols, and images as well as through the operations of
formal institutions and structures of power.282
With this appreciation of the mechanism of reproduction of stereotypes
in mind, I suggested that it might be possible to disrupt the cultural and
cognitive reproduction of gendered social categories by shifting the
examples encountered in the real world and by introducing counter-images
in the media, so as to change the content of these categories bit by bit.283
This idea to conceive of reform of social practices of prejudice and
discrimination as the cumulative effect of many small interventions at the
local level is found in current scholarship on discrimination that takes
cognitive processes into account. For example, Tristin Green’s most recent
account of appearance discrimination in the workplace understands
personal appearance choices sometimes to be connected to
microperformances working against race and gender stereotypes; Green
would allow those acts of transgressive appearance to operate against a
contrary employer code of dress and behavior, so long as the employee
asserted that s/he was in fact expressing a particular trait for an identity
category that had been historically the subject of processes of dominance
and subordination.284 Jerry Kang’s appreciation of the microprocesses by
which racial subordination is perpetuated through the recurrence of images
that sustain cognitive categories leads to his proposal to introduce “Trojan
horses of race” into various social settings via “debiasing public service
281

MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES 20 (1995).
282
Id. at 21–22.
283
Poirier, Gender Stereotypes, supra note 201, at 1097–98, 1120–21.
284
Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: Workplace Assimilation Demands and the Contact
Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379, 418–20 (2008). Similarly, Tristin Green and Alexandra Kalev,
noting that many of the sources of discrimination are relational, have proposed a series of structural
approaches in the work place that would reorient it from “stereotype reinforcing” to “stereotype
challenging.” Tristin K. Green & Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the
Relational Level, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1436 (2008). Thus for example they recommend structuring
work through cooperative interdependence rather than rigid hierarchy, id. at 1449, and relying on
network collaboration in which higher and lower status workers are placed on collaborative teams. Id.
at 1449–53.
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announcements,” so as to disrupt and shift the processes that (re)produce
stereotypes on the level of everyday interaction.285 A small section of an
article of mine on cognitive bias reiterated the role of visibility of
workplace performances of gendered occupational roles in creating and
maintaining gender stereotypes, and argued that the owners of workplaces
should be held responsible in some measure to control the sites of
reproduction of disadvantageous gender stereotypes.286
One can appreciate the brave forays into transgressive visibility
undertaken in the past by lone individuals; they have made possible the
current broader challenges to traditionalist views on homosexuality.287
Recently, in Microperformances of Identity: Visible Same-Sex Couples and
the Marriage Controversy, I juxtaposed some of Erving Goffman’s
scrupulous descriptions of small personal interactions around identity
performance, Kenji Yoshino’s consideration of passing and covering, and
some of Judith Butler’s writings about transgressive identity
performance.288 In different ways, all these authors link the cumulative
effect of microperformances to the larger identity categories, including
normal and stigmatized identity categories, that are at stake in a certain
kind of social movement.
In this regard, I also bring to bear, in Microperformances, an essay on
new social movements by sociologist Joseph Gusfield.289 He argues that
where traditional social movements typically had concrete economic and
legislative goals in mind, a certain kind of newer and diffuse social
285
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1579–84 (2005). See generally
Kang & Banaji, supra note 275, at 1080 (arguing that “we need a new model of discrimination for
implicit bias—one based on a more accurate model of human cognition and emotions. This new model
must promote proactive structural interventions that minimize harm without relying solely on potential
individual litigation.”).
286
Poirier, Cognitive Bias, supra note 13, at 464, 486, 491. Authors typically conceive of these
proposed interventions in terms of visibility. Mae Kuykendall, however, uses aural and linguistic
imagery to describe this emergence of same-sex relationships towards acceptability. See Kuykendall,
Gay Marriage, supra note 34, at 1027 (discerning an increasing “willingness to listen to the lives of
gay people” and an obligation of the state “to provide structures that address spoken lives”); id. at 1028
(describing “a program of rhetorical silencing”); id. at 1009 (arguing that same-sex marriage litigation
“assigns to [courts] a historic role in exploding the vacuum of public speech voiced to celebrate gay
marriage”; see also Kuykendall, Resistance, supra note 206, at 388 (describing the federal Defense of
Marriage Act as a project of “de-authorization of a subset of marriage speech that a significant number
of citizens deploy for self-definition and that a significant number of other citizens respect and adopt”);
id. at 391 (arguing that “the critical fact about gay marriage is the reality of its being spoken, and the
accompanying ordinary expectation that the state will absorb the expanded meaning”). The two
vocabularies—visible and linguistic/aural—are entirely compatible. Nor are they metaphors. Both
describe important, concrete ways in which LGBT individuals and couples are either recognized and
acknowledged socially and legally, or in which recognition is withheld.
287
See, e.g., Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale, supra note 270, at 297–300 (describing the
piecemeal progress of early gay and lesbian rights movements).
288
See Poirier, Microperformances of Identity, supra note 271.
289
Id. at 23–25, 67 (discussing Joseph R. Gusfield, The Reflexivity of Social Movements:
Collective Behavior and Mass Society Revisited, in NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: FROM IDEOLOGY TO
IDENTITY 58 (Enrique Laraña, Hank Johnston, & Joseph R. Gusfield eds., 1994)).
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movement is also about meaning and identity.
As such, one may
participate in the sense of realizing that things are not necessarily as they
were in everyday life, without being corralled and organized by the leaders
of the movement.291 The potential shift in diffuse social meaning that is
effected by these movements is available to everyone, at the level of smallscale everyday life. Indeed, as Gusfield and his co-authors argue in
another essay, “many contemporary movements are ‘acted out’ in
individual actions rather than through or among mobilized groups.”292
Thus, we can appreciate small and personal interactions to be not the
tail-end of identity-based social movements, but their fundamental building
block. And the insertion of a differential naming practice into these
everyday interactions can be appreciated as a potential disruption of the
basic mechanism of seeking to change social and legal mechanisms of
identity recognition. To be sure, the marriage equality movement, like
other identity-based social movements, has specific and significant legal
goals in mind too, but it also contains very important elements of retooling
microinteractions around family recognition, normal and stigmatized
status, and increased dignity and freedom. It is both local and larger than
local at the same time.
One can discern both kinds of concern in skillful articulations of the
marriage equality movement’s politics. This is evident in a recent
articulation of strategy sent out by all the major LGBT litigation and
advocacy groups in June 2008, in the wake of the California marriage
equality victory. In a document entitled Make Change, Not Lawsuits,293
same-sex couples were encouraged to get married in California if they
wished, but not to sue in their home states, and not to sue the federal
government or their employers. Instead, once they got married, they
should “call themselves married, and ask (sometimes demand) that family,
friends, neighbors, businesses, employers and the community treat their
marriages with respect.”294 Why? “Making the marriages of same-sex
290
Gusfield, supra note 289, at 64 (arguing that social movements typically involve both formal
associational structures with specific goals and a more diffuse challenge to cultural meanings, including
everyday interactions and understandings of identity). In one example, he argues that “Homosexuals
attempt to change discriminatory laws but also become more open about their identity. Interaction
between homosexuals and heterosexuals takes on a new tone.” Id. at 66. See also Reed, supra note 34,
at 895–900 (discussing the production of “identity goods” by social movements, and the way in which
state constitutional politics may be shaped by struggles over identity goods).
291
Gusfield, supra note 289, at 62 (arguing that being a member of the women’s movement is
about ideational commitment rather than formal membership, and “has its locus in a multiplicity of
events, often that of individuals”).
292
Hank Johnston et al., Identities, Grievances, and New Social Movements, in NEW SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS: FROM IDEOLOGY TO IDENTITY 3, 7 (Enrique Laraña, Hank Johnston, & Joseph R.
Gusfield eds., 1994).
293
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ET AL., MAKE CHANGE, NOT LAWSUITS (2008), available
at
http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/Joint_Advisory_-_Final.pdf?docID=3241
[hereinafter
MAKE CHANGE].
294
Id. at 1.
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couples a conspicuous part of American society will help us get something
we’ll need to win ultimately: public acceptance of equal treatment for
lesbian and gay families.”295 It is these diffuse “conversations”296 that will
“make the changes in law enduring and real at a day-to-day level.”297 I
analyzed the Make Change strategy—which I call a “conversation”
strategy—in a section of my Microperformances article.298
The conversation strategy develops apace. In late February, 2009, in
the wake of the November, 2008, Proposition 8 reversal by referendum of
the California marriage equality decision, a new effort within the
“conversation” strategy was unveiled.299 The American Civil Liberties
Union LGBT & AIDS Project argued that
Research has shown that the single most effective way to
change people’s minds on LGBT issues is through one-to-one
conversations, between either gay people or solid allies and
their friends and family. Knowing someone gay, it turns out,
is not enough. People have to talk with someone they trust
about what it is like to be gay—ways in which it poses
special challenges, ways in which it is quite ordinary.300
This strategy is now not just about coming out; it is about contact,
conversation, and interaction with visibly LGTBQ folk. So a website has
been created, as part of a coordinated conversation project, to encourage
LGBTQ people to talk to three friends or acquaintances, not just about
coming out, but about what it is like to be gay.301 There are apparently
several similar sites, and no copyright, so the whole project is expected to
evolve.302 The “conversation” strategy has come of age.303
295

Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
298
Poirier, Microperformances of Identity, supra note 271, at 59–72 (discussing the
“conversation” strategy).
299
See Matt Coles, Prop 8: Let’s Not Make the Same Mistake Next Time, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb.
26,
2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matt-coles/prop-8-lets-not-make-the_b_170271.html
(discussing the election loss and how to garner more votes in the future).
300
Id. See Fowler, supra note 23 (describing what is essentially a conversation strategy being
deployed in view of the anticipated loss in the California Supreme Court on the challenge to
proposition 8); Jesse McKinley, Group Renews Fight for Same-Sex Marriage in California, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A21 (same).
301
Tell3, http://www.tell-three.org (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
302
Coles, supra note 299.
303
Compare MAKE CHANGE, supra note 293, at 1–5 (suggesting that conversation will help make
change), and Coles, supra note 299 (promoting one-on-one conversation as the most effective way to
change people’s minds about gay marriage), with Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal
Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 567, 610–13 (1994–95) (explaining that gay persons should share what it means to them
to be married). Wolfson was a Senior Staff Attorney of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund at
the time of this publication. Id. at 567 n.*. The essay includes a section on “what is to be done” to
further the cause of marriage equality. Id. at 610–14. While acknowledging that the battles to achieve
296
297
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Now consider what the insertion of a novel and unfamiliar term for a
key family form into those conversations might do. As I have suggested,
the “conversation” strategy around marriage equality relies on the fact that
everyone involved already has a pretty good appreciation of what
“marriage” means.304 Then we get a law that tells same-sex couples their
relationships are legally recognized, but as “civil unions.” Now what? In
Connecticut, if individuals and couples converse in terms of “civil union”
the whole “conversation” strategy will be denatured and confusing. How
can one talk about what it feels like to be a partner in a civil union? It just
will not have the effect that the leaders of the marriage equality movement
are counting on.
It is less intelligible in a wide variety of
microinteractions. One important point here: the smallest of details in
interactions around “marriage” and “civil union” matter. They matter not
just in a personal sense, but in a political sense as well. The name
“marriage” and what it automatically conveys to those engaged in
conversations are central to the marriage equality movement at this
juncture. And that is because the local instances of naming practices and
what they communicate are integral to the larger structures of identity and
meaning that it is the goal of the political movement to change.
A final point for this section is fittingly both narrow and broad. We
have a name for a certain social practice or device that cuts through the
local and the universal, communicating persuasively in a way that can
change minds: storytelling, or narrative. Narrative is concrete and is
persuasive in its concreteness. Yet it also contains and conveys exemplars
that appear to be generalizable. It is a vehicle for moral conversation from
time immemorial. Narrative can be deceptive and also can be misused.305
But narrative is essential to the politics of marriage equality.
This is true only in part because narrative forms the basis of the current
“conversation” strategy, as I am calling it. This idea about the narrative
edge came to me while I was reviewing the affidavits in the Kerrigan
case.306 They are extraordinarily gracious, articulate, compelling vignettes.
access to marriage for same-sex couples would involve other fora in addition to the courts, the role of
individuals as articulated in this essay was to do local organization work or write letters. Id. at 612–13.
Even though Wolfson’s strategy here involved “explaining why gay people should share, and be
allowed to share, in the rights and responsibilities of marriage,” he situated this activity within the
projects and goals of more organized social movements, not in dispersed families and neighborhoods;
and it is not portrayed as the basis of change but as just one, ancillary part of it.
304
Poirier, Microperformances of Identity, supra note 271, at 62 (discussing the already-known
quality of the scripts about marriage deployed in the conversation strategy).
305
See generally Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L REV. 807 (1993) (enumerating some helpful aspects of legal storytelling,
then critiquing its misuse); Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-Understanding: A Defense of
Outsider Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEO. L.J. 1845 (1994) (responding to critics of legal
storytelling, including Farber and Sherry).
306
Thanks to Bennett Klein of Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders for providing the
plaintiffs’ affidavits to me.
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They are typically quite brief, and they convey effectively the personal
sense of urgency and intangible injury around marriage equality in a way
that is compelling—compelling in a different and perhaps stronger way
than abstract argument ever could be. The Kerrigan opinions cite to the
affidavits, as do various opinions to similar affidavits, in practically all the
marriage equality cases. It is the stories of the plaintiffs that shape the
more abstract debate.
The same is true in the Vermont and New Jersey investigations of the
effectiveness of civil unions.307 Those reports are also replete with
individual stories. The short documentary film Freeheld also comes to
mind.308 It told the story of police detective Lieutenant Laurel Hester of
Ocean County, New Jersey, dying of cancer, who fought to have the Ocean
County Board of Freeholders exercise its option under the New Jersey
domestic partnership law then in force so that Hester’s long-time partner in
life, Stacie André, could receive benefits upon Hester’s death. Not only
did personalization of the effects of the Board’s decision whether to accept
domestic partnerships work for Hester and André—the film won an Oscar
for best short documentary. Professional advocates for marriage equality
also are often especially effective and persuasive when they are narrating
their own stories.309
Recently Nancy Levit, in a speech assessing Martha Nussbaum’s
recent work, pointed out the tension in the LGBT rights movement—the
difficulty of telling stories about LGBT plaintiffs that will appeal to middle
America without succumbing to a heteronormative bias.310 A follow-up
conversation with Levit convinced me that the whole topic of the
storytelling strategy of the marriage equality movement is worthy of
academic study;311 and that the skillfully told stories like those in the
307

NEW JERSEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 16; VERMONT 2008 REPORT, supra note 16.
FREEHELD: THE LAUREL HESTER STORY (Lieutenant Films 2006); see also Freeheld: The
Laurel Hester Story, www.freeheld.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2009) (providing information about
Freeheld).
309
See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Using an “Incidents of Marriage” Analysis When Considering
Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples’ Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 13
WIDENER L.J. 699, 702–06 (2004) (narrating the effect of Professor Cox’s marriage); Andrew Sullivan,
My Big Fat Straight Wedding, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 2008, at 17 (narrating the effect of Mr. Sullivan’s
marriage).
310
Nancy Levit, Comments at the Columbia Law School Symposium in Honor of Martha
Nussbaum (Feb. 13, 2009). See Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual
Minorities, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1348687, at 10-13.
311
See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Parents, The State and
Proposition 8, STAN. J. C.R. C.L. (forthcoming 2009) (analyzing the rhetoric in the Yes on 8 media
spots in fall 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1381702. A classic use of storytelling theory
to describe a range of LGBT issues and politics is Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche
Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46
U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992). Levit’s remarks encouraged the presentation of more transgressive or
queer stories as part of contemporary LGBTQ advocacy. Fajer, writing a generation ago, when the
overall political balance was quite different, recommended using stories of love, relationship, and
308
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Kerrigan affidavits could profitably be published and shared widely with a
general audience.
A generation ago, Gerald Lopez pointed out that stock stories form a
repertoire that a good lawyer needs to use to persuade.312 The
“conversation” strategy is nothing but lay lawyering and choice among
stock stories, top to bottom. The names we use for ourselves in these
stories are key, particularly names charged with history and honor, or
names that are empty and susceptible of interpretation as a code for other
names, bad names, or dishonorable names. We need to consider seriously
how the name “civil union” messes with our stock stories.
IV. THE “CIVIL UNION”/“MARRIAGE” DISTINCTION FOSTERS HARM
WHEN APPLIED IN EVERYDAY SOCIAL PRACTICES OF NAMING AND
RECOGNIZING FAMILIES
A. Once It Is Time to Give Same-Sex Relationships an Official Name
Having said so much about naming as a diffuse social practice, we can
now be somewhat briefer about the harm created by the Act. It is a naming
harm.
The Civil Union Act sought to correct a prior practice of refusing to
recognize same-sex relationships legally at all. The legislature therefore
had to decide what name to use for the same-sex couple status it sought
legally to recognize. Same-sex couples could no longer remain legally
nameless. To be sure, a certain kind of piecemeal recognition in
Connecticut prior to 2005 had allowed the creation of rights regarding
property, health care proxy, inheritance, children, etc., all without giving a
unifying name to same-sex couples’ committed relationships. At some
point that kind of approach becomes awkward and seems to point towards
a more wholesale recognition.313 The gestalt can change from a series of
unconnected rights and obligations to a series of points which, understood
to be connected, delineate a more organic view of the rights and
obligations that inhere in LGBT identity. Moreover, inasmuch as part of
the wholesale recognition process would likely involve some kind of
formal ceremonial recognition of status, same-sex couples recognized by
the state simply had to have a name.
But what name? The legislature could have established legal
family to counter a “sex-as-lifestyle” pre-understanding and stigma attached to gay men and lesbians.
Id. at 546–70. That is certainly what the marriage equality movement has tended to do, but to the
exclusion from visibility and respectability of the more queer among us.
312
Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984).
313
See Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale, supra note 270, at 297–323 (discussing the piecemeal
evolution of GLBT rights in New Jersey as a predicate to the potential for wholesale acceptance of such
rights).
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recognition by allowing same-sex couples to “marry.”
Instead, the
legislature decided to recognize same-sex couples by a different name.
B. The Problem of the Naming Distinction: Categorizing Couples as
“Same-Sex” or “Opposite-Sex” is Widely Understood as “Gay” or
“Straight,” and This Distinction, Against a Cultural Background of
Stereotyping and Prejudice, Results in an Implied Stigma
The point intuited by the Kerrigan court and other nomenclature
opinions, though not always very clearly expressed, is that this official
difference in naming works an ongoing harm, often trivial in any one
instance but cumulatively problematic, because of the way that the new
name, alongside the old one, will have effect in practice in everyday life.
The availability of two different names will tend to force anyone involved
in identifying or even thinking about a couple or family relationship to
perform the distinction between same-sex and different-sex couples. In
any everyday interaction involving a couple (or one member of a couple or
another family member), a person naming the couple or member will have
to ask: “What name am I to use? Is this one a ‘civil union’ or a
‘marriage?’”315 They will have to consciously speak or write one way or
another, acting on their knowledge about whether the couple is same-sex or
different-sex. (Or perhaps they will have to acknowledge, confronted with
the choice of names, that they do not know but ought to, or perhaps the
two-name structure will make them inquire.) The diffuse naming behavior
called for by the two-name structure will often, probably most of the time,
remind the speaker, as well as everyone involved in recognizing the name,
that a same-sex couple is likely gay or lesbian. Moreover, that silent
invocation of “gay or lesbian” will, more often than not, prompt the person
doing the naming and anyone who hears the name to rehearse cognitively,
often unconsciously, whatever associations they may have with “gay or
lesbian.”316 These associations may be good or bad in any individual
314
To be sure, this would also have been a political stance. No neutral position is available in the
choice of names for a same-sex couple.
315
In certain legal circumstances that question will be legally required. In a much larger set of
social circumstances, knowing that the couple may be legally recognized, it will likely be thought
appropriate to ask, although there would be no legal penalty for using the same terminology for all
couple relationships.
316
As Kang & Banaji describe the process generally:
Unconscious stereotypes, rooted in social categorization, are ubiquitous and
chronically accessible. They are automatically prompted by the mere presence
of a target mapped into a particular social category. Thus, when we see a Black
(or a White) person, the attitude and stereotypes associated with that racial
category automatically activate. Further, these attitudes and stereotypes
influence our judgments, as well as inhibit countertypical associations.
Kang & Banaji, supra note 275, at 1084 (citations omitted). Associations to LGBT folks may trigger a
number of negative stereotypes and prejudices. In the context of same-sex couples, one can anticipate
additional associations around sexual activity, often understood as non-normative or illicit or immoral;
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instance. But one can presume that, even in a relatively enlightened
population like the citizens and residents of Connecticut,317 there will often
be negative associations with the category of gay or lesbian, given the
recent and widespread history of stereotyping, prejudice, and
discrimination. Stereotyping and prejudice undoubtedly continue to exist
in the cognitive associations of many, many individuals within the state,
and can be manifested in interactions that are as a practical matter beyond
the purview of the state’s legal power.
Put another way, establishing the separate name “civil union”
interpellates in a certain way. For one thing, it interpellates the members
of a same-sex couple as gay or lesbian, with all that that identification may
entail. It does so indirectly, without using those names, simply because as
a matter of social fact the separate name “civil union” will be understood
as a proxy for gay or lesbian. “Civil union” interpellates indirectly in
another sense, and does so even when the members of a same-sex couple
(or their relatives and friends) are not themselves immediately responding
to a “hail.” In the web of social understandings and relationships, the
separate category “gay and lesbian” will be reinforced in all who must
name family structures. That means everyone. Inserting the term “civil
union” into social discourse interpellates everyone to continue to perform
distinctions between heterosexual and gay/lesbian families, by naming and
recognizing them differently.
The state can well say, as it did in the Civil Union Act, that “civil
union” is to be deemed the equivalent of “marriage” and that the other
cognate kinship and ceremonial terms include civil union.318 That
disclaimer is simply ineffective, given the way diffuse social practice
works. Establishing the distinction legally, so as to force everyone to
recognize and maintain the distinction, will in itself reinforce pre-existing
everyday social practices of categorization, and the cognitive structures
as well as around parenting stereotypes.
317
These groups overlap, but not entirely. I am getting at the ongoing cumulative and shared
semiotic field produced by many microinteractions. A more accurate description of the relevant
category, were it not so cumbersome and jargony, would be “all those who interact with one another
around the process of identifying couples qua couples, and who collectively constitute and produce the
ongoing cultural semiotic field of the State of Connecticut.” As I wrote recently elsewhere, “The core
dynamics [of the Kulturkampf] are either local and place-based, or are universal and aterritorial,
occurring at diffuse . . . levels of scale; and they all involve the discursive spaces within which we
produce and reproduce tradition and identity.” Poirier, Identity Processes, supra note 271, at 391
(footnote omitted). Communities like Connecticut are imagined, though they are no less real because
of that fact. See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 2006).
318
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38oo (2005) (“[W]herever in the general statutes the term ‘spouse’,
‘family’, ‘immediate family’, ‘dependent family’, ‘next of kin’ or any other term that denotes the
spousal relationship are used or defined, a party to a civil union relationship shall be included in such
use or definition, and wherever in the general statutes . . . the term ‘marriage’ is used or defined, a civil
union shall be included in such use or definition.”), held unconstitutional, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of
Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
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that underlie them, including those harmful ones that are against the policy
of the state and plausibly unconstitutional.
Thomas Healy’s account of the working of stigmatic injury is helpful
here in the mechanism it discerns for stigmatic injury.319 As a general
background point, Healy argues that law both reflects and helps to shape
social norms about stigmatized identity.320 “[I]t signals what behavior is
appropriate toward certain groups.”321 There are several other effects as
well. Where the law results in physical segregation, it can make
overcoming stigma more difficult.322 And the law can create categories
that are used as the “basis for stigmatization.”323 Importantly, though, “law
can also be used to combat stigma[,]” because “when law removes its
stamp of inferiority from stigmatized groups, society is likely to do the
same.”324
Healy identifies several types of harm from stigma, including the threat
of discrimination,325 the actual experience of discrimination,326 the threat of
loss of self-esteem,327 and the internalization of negative stereotypes by the
stigmatized, who then behave differently—the so-called “stereotype
threat.”328 Summarizing these types of injury, Healy argues that those who
are in a stigmatized identity category are injured “because the
government’s action brands them with a mark of disgrace that invites
discrimination and prejudice against them, threatens their self-esteem, and
makes them vulnerable to stereotype threats and self-fulfilling
prophecies.”329
Healy also argues persuasively that where a group is already
stigmatized government action can add to the injury:
319

Healy, supra note 35.
See, e.g., id. at 451 (discussing the interplay of law and stigma).
321
Id. at 452.
322
E.g., id. (“[W]hen law requires or permits segregation of stigmatized groups, it makes it more
difficult for those groups to overcome the stereotypes that help to generate their stigma.”).
323
Id.
324
Id. at 452–53.
325
Id. at 453–54 (“[B]ecause the stigmatized are marked as less than fully human, they face the
‘ever-present possibility’ that they will be the targets of prejudice and discrimination.”) (internal
citations omitted).
326
Id. at 454 (“[D]iscrimination makes it harder for the stigmatized to obtain employment,
housing, education, and to develop lasting relationships with others.”).
327
Id. at 454–56 (discussing the mechanisms of loss of self-esteem).
328
Id. at 456–58 (discussing the internalization and self-fulfilling prophecy victims of
stigmatization may experience). On stereotype threat and intellectual performance, see, for example,
Kang & Banaji, supra note 275, at 1087–90 (discussing evidence of stereotype threat as well as
“stereotype boost” to positively-stereotyped minorities and “stereotype lift” to those in competition
with negatively stereotyped minorities). Basically, “arbitrary environmental cues can trigger implicit
cognitive processes that interfere or facilitate performance on seemingly objective measures.” Id. at
1089.
329
Healy, supra note 35, at 461. Healy’s discussion is informed by the work of Erving Goffman
on stigma and interactions. Id. at 422 & n.29, 449, 454 (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON
THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963)).
320
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By reinforcing the social belief that those with a particular
trait are discredited, the government adds to the prejudice and
discrimination against them, creates additional threats to their
self-esteem, and reaffirms the stereotypes that lead to selffulfilling prophecies. The government’s role also likely
increases the intensity of these harms, particularly the threat
to self-esteem.330
Healy contends that the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas,331 in
deciding to reach the due process issue presented to it and to overrule
Bowers v. Hardwick,332 indicated the availability of stigmatic harm as a
constitutionally cognizable injury.333 Healy’s point about Lawrence is
correct, though it requires some fine-tuning when the stigmatizing law is a
naming statute rather than a criminal one. It is not enough to note that
Lawrence and the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction both involve
homosexuality, though historic stereotyping and prejudice around
homosexuality is the underlying context for the stigmatic injury in both
instances. The Lawrence opinion defines the stigmatic harm in terms of a
kind of penumbra from the moral taint of criminalization.334 Moreover, the
Court points out, the stigmatic harm from criminalization “is not trivial.”335
In the context of “civil union” the argument is slightly more complex. The
mere fact of a nomenclature distinction allows the underlying stigmatized
category of homosexual to remain more active in social and legal
microinteractions than if the name “marriage” had been adopted for all
couples. And because the name for the family unit must be deployed day
in and day out, the reactivation of underlying cognitive biases is likely to
be constant.336
330
331
332

Id. at 464.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558

(2003).

333

Healy, supra note 35, at 438–41.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575:
If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so remains
unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were
not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons. When homosexual
conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of
itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in
the public and in the private spheres.
335
Id.
336
The practice of routinely categorizing individuals and couples in daily life according to
whether they are in same-sex or different-sex relationships seems to me somewhat different from the
notion that criminalization conveys a message of stigma. The naming process occurs more frequently
and in a wider variety of contexts than the act of identifying sodomy as criminal. To be sure, scholars
have argued that identifying same-sex couples qua couples will often trigger associations to same-sex
sex. See, e.g., Mary Ann Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal
History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1643–45, 1658–63 (1993)
(discussing associations between same-sex couples and same-sex sex and the negative implications of
this association in different social contexts); Fajer, supra note 311, at 516, 538–46 (discussing what he
334
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Healy’s analysis of stigmatic injury resonates with a germinal work by
Charles Lawrence, the important 1987 article The Id, the Ego and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism.337 Lawrence’s article
was a response to the doctrine of discriminatory purpose established for
purposes of federal constitutional civil rights law in Washington v.
Davis.338 Lawrence argued that “the injury of racial inequality exists
irrespective of the decision maker’s motives.”339 He proposed a different
way of thinking about racism, one “that more accurately describes both its
origins and the nature of the injury that it inflicts.”340 Lawrence focused on
shared ideas, attitudes, and beliefs, the racist content of which we may well
be unaware.341 These ideas are part of the culture which we inherit342 and
which we in turn reproduce. Lawrence argued that racism is culturally
“transmitted by tacit understandings.”343 Focusing on intent thus ignores
much of what we know about the workings of racism. If we wish to
eradicate racism, Lawrence argued, we must “recognize racism’s primary
source.”344 Focusing on “cultural symbols that have racial meaning,”
Lawrence recommended a “cultural meaning” test for government action—
governmental action should be evaluated “to determine whether it conveys
a symbolic message to which the culture attaches racial significance.”345 If
so, it would receive strict scrutiny in the courts.
Professor Lawrence also elaborated on a theory of equal protection as a
right to be free from stigma.346 Stigma involves labeling a group as
inferior in a way that shames and degrades that group’s members.347
Stigma involves a whole “social system of laws, practices, and cultural
mores . . . .”348 It injures in two ways, according to Lawrence: by inflicting
psychological injury on the individual’s dignity and self-respect, and by
branding the individual in a way that affects others’ respect for and
calls the “sex-as-lifestyle assumption,” which reduces gay men and lesbians to an imputed focus on
sexual activity). Criminalization for sexual conduct conveys stigma, as does an attribution of obsessive
focus on sexuality. The two stigmatic insults are related, but not quite the same.
337
Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, supra note 131, at 318. Indeed, Healy relies on Lawrence’s work.
Healy, supra note 35, at 467–68.
338
Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, supra note 131, at 318 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976)).
339
Id. at 319.
340
Id. at 321.
341
Id. at 322.
342
Id. at 323.
343
Id.
344
Id.
345
Id. at 324.
346
Id. at 349–55. Lawrence relied expressly on Kenneth Karst’s theory of equal protection. Id. at
350 n.141 (citing inter alia Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship, supra note 36, and Kenneth L. Karst,
Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245 (1983)). He also expressly noted Karst’s acknowledgement
of Erving Goffman’s work on stigma. Id. at 350 n.143 (noting Karst’s reliance on GOFFMAN, supra
note 329, at 1–9)).
347
Id. at 350.
348
Id.
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349

interaction with her.
The injury of stigmatization is cumulative.350
Moreover, stigma is “self-perpetuating.”351
Stigma is at its heart a symbolic injury.352 But symbols usually don’t
have inherent meaning. They are interpreted only in light of a cultural
tradition which gives them their negative understanding and thus creates
the injury. As Lawrence explains: “[I]n most cases the symbol is not
inherently pejorative. Rather, the message obtains its shameful meaning
from the historical and cultural context in which it is used and, ultimately,
from the way it is interpreted by those who witness it.”353 “[S]tigmatizing
actions injure by virtue of the meaning society gives them . . . .”354 Intent
is not necessary to infliction of the injury.355 But an understanding of the
cultural meaning of symbols attached by law to groups is essential.
The symbolic action at issue in one classic pronouncement of stigmatic
injury was school segregation. Brown v. Board of Education held that
even where physical facilities and other tangible factors are equal,
segregating schoolchildren “solely because of their race generates a feeling
of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”356 Therefore, the Court
held, “Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”357 This
holding was limited to public education in the Brown case itself,358 but it
has been applied to other kinds of segregation, and is the basis for a sense
of equal citizenship that some argue is of constitutional scope under the
Equal Protection Clause.359 The harm—or at least the intangible harm,
349

Id. at 351.
“[S]eparate incidents of racial stigmatization do not inflict isolated injuries but are part of a
mutually reinforcing and pervasive pattern of stigmatizing actions that cumulate to compose an
injurious whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.” Id. at 351.
351
Id.
352
“The injury of stigmatization consists of forcing the injured individual to wear a badge or
symbol that degrades him in the eyes of society.” Id.
353
Id.
354
Id.
355
Id.
356
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
357
Id. at 495.
358
Id.
359
See, e.g., KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 36 (developing a theory of equal
citizenship that is protected by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); Karst,
Foreword: Equal Citizenship, supra note 36 (same).
One of the classic follow-on statements about the stigma of separate categories apart from any
tangible harm may not help as much as its frequent citation might suggest. Heckler v. Mathews
contains broad language about the stigma of categorization; the Court wrote:
[D]iscrimination itself, by perpetuating “archaic and stereotypic notions” or by
stigmatizing members of a disfavored group as “innately inferior” and therefore as
less worthy participants in the political community, can cause serious non-economic
injuries to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely because
of their membership in the disfavored group.
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739–40 (1984) (citations and footnote omitted). But this case was
about economic discrimination against men in the context of government retirement benefits. Not
350
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where it coexists with tangible harm—of segregation comes not from the
physical separation but from the act of separating folks into two classes
based on race.
Now consider the Kerrigan case. The naming or labeling at stake in
the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction has nothing of physical
segregation about it in the sense of the placing of live bodies in one
location versus another. But it involves an important, if intangible
institution—the family and its name—and authorizes (and in legal contexts
requires) a linguistic sorting of couples and their families. The labeling
distinction is about exclusion from the use of an important intangible
institution.360 Underneath the ostensibly neutral label of “civil union” lies
another category, which will be widely understood.
The Kerrigan court cites Brown v. Board, as it should have.361 Equally
important, in my view, is the court’s citation to a Connecticut case,
Evening Sentinel v. National Organization for Women.362 That case
involved help-wanted advertisements that had been sorted by the
publishing newspapers into men only, women only, and either men or
women.363 Citing to the “no such thing as separate but equal” principle of
Brown v. Board, the court in Evening Sentinel held that “segregating
employment opportunities advertisements into racial, religious, age,
national origin or ancestry or sex classifications constitutes
discrimination.”364 The newspaper therefore could not, acting on its own,
engage in this kind of impermissible sorting; to do so was “aiding and
abetting” advertisers and employers, prohibited under the statute.365 Actual
physical segregation or exclusion was not at issue; moreover, no job was
actually denied on account of sex. This case was about a classification
harm. It was a matter of “[s]ymbolic discrimination.”366 The separately
labeled help-wanted ads could reinforce the actions of others in separating
jobs into different kinds for men and women and, concurrently, reinforce
conceptions of men and women as suitable for different kinds of job
exactly your typical stigmatized group. Healy argues that the problem in the case was really one of an
underinclusive statute, as to which Congress had provided in advance that any attempt to challenge the
underinclusiveness would be remedied by leveling down. Thus it would appear that any lawsuit for
underinclusiveness could be met with a standing challenge, as no remedy would be available under the
terms of the statute itself. The statement about intangible stigmatic injury was, according to Healy, a
way of getting the plaintiff standing to challenge a statute that otherwise might have been
unreviewable. Healy, supra note 35, at 433.
360
See generally Poirier, Cultural Property, supra note 4, at 362–66 (using language of access
and exclusion and similar property rhetoric as an entry into discussion of traditionalist concern about
misuse of the institution of marriage by same-sex couples).
361
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407, 418 (Conn. 2008) (citing Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
362
Id. (citing Evening Sentinel v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 357 A.2d 498 (Conn. 1975)).
363
Evening Sentinel, 357 A.2d at 501.
364
Id.
365
Id. at 502.
366
Id. at 504.
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opportunities—thus perpetuating stereotypes as well as limiting actual
opportunities for women.367 Although the court in Evening Sentinel did not
use this language, the case was about a kind of stigmatic injury. The court
also had to interpret the exclusionary classification against a cultural and
historical background. It noted a contemporary policy in the state of
Connecticut to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women,368 and
noted that the act at issue addressed “subtle” as well as overt
discrimination.369 The statute therefore prohibited not only exclusion from
jobs but “practices leading to and facilitating such discrimination.”370
The establishment of two separate names for a basic family structure is
very much like the establishment of separate listings for jobs for men and
women. It does not in itself say anything explicitly prejudicial. But it will
be read against a history of prejudice. Also, it forces those seeking to alter
the underlying important social structure (families or jobs, as the case may
be) to proceed through the use of categories that have pernicious effects
that the state is clearly committed to countering. Just as the separate job
listings were read by the Connecticut Supreme Court to cause harm
through symbolic discrimination, the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction
read in context aids and abets a cognizable constitutional injury. Evening
Sentinel, then, should be taken not just as part of a string cite, but as a
helpful gloss on the Connecticut Supreme Court’s reasoning on cognizable
injury in Kerrigan.
Once a distinction is established, the processes of stereotyping and
prejudice unfold as of themselves. For this reason, it seems to me, impact
rather than intent is key in understanding the injury in the Civil Union Act.
Inquiring into what the legislature intended by establishing a distinct term
“civil union” is not relevant. Once the legislature establishes the term
“civil union,” it is how the term will work in everyday life that matters.
This insight may help us address the concern that no invidious intent had
been shown (the concern voiced by the dissenting justices in Kerrigan),
and that only discriminatory purpose would rise to the level of
constitutional injury.371 The Kerrigan majority did not explain this as
367
As the court wrote, “The very act of classifying individuals by means of criteria irrelevant to
the ultimate end sought to be accomplished operates in a discriminatory manner. Such discrimination is
destructive to society as a whole in that it eliminates a class of individuals who otherwise could have
made vital and fresh contributions.” Id.
368
Id. at 503–04.
369
Id. at 504. Interestingly, Professor Lawrence provides an example of physical segregation of
men and women in which the cultural background meaning would be exculpatory. Whereas racial
segregation of restrooms would be read in a context of stigma, segregation of restrooms by sex would
not. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, supra note 131, at 351–52 (noting that segregation of men and
women in the restroom context is socially acceptable while segregating individuals by race is not); see
also Healy, supra note 35, at 467–68 (discussing Lawrence’s restroom example).
370
Evening Sentinel v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 357 A.2d 498, 504 (Conn. 1975).
371
Justice Borden objects that there has been no intent to discriminate or stigmatize. Kerrigan v.
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 514 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J., dissenting). Justice Zarella
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372

clearly as it could have.
Nor does the fact that the term “civil union” has no history mean it
cannot possibly be a source of harm, as Justice Borden would have it.373 It
is inserted into a rich history of family and kinship naming, a cipher that
must be spoken in conjunction with a distinction (gay-straight) with
widespread and harmful associations in the recent past. It simply is not
neutral. The distinction itself will reinforce underlying stereotypes
associated with gay and lesbian individuals and couples. No factual
inquiry is needed here.
Some courts addressing the nomenclature issue have discerned an
injury in “civil union” or “domestic partner” because its use forces
members of such a relationship to disclose that they are gay or lesbian
when they would prefer not to.374 That is certainly a harm of the
information privacy sort (though not one addressed separately by the
Kerrigan court). But that separate issue of control of disclosure of
personal information does not address the generic harm that is perpetrated
by the establishment of differential legal kinship names society-wide.
Consider the “Miss”/“Mrs.” harm. It is not about disclosure of private fact
as such—marital status is always public somewhere.375 The concern is
rather that the “Miss”/“Mrs.” distinction reinforces and makes more
makes a similar argument. See id. at 521–23 (Zarella, J., dissenting) (noting that the “driving force
behind the development of traditional marriage” between a man and a woman was not intentionally
discriminatory toward gay and lesbian individuals). The Kerrigan majority looks at disparate treatment
alone. Id. at 412. The Act “directly classif[ies] and prescrib[es] distinct treatment on the basis of
sexual orientation” and “operate[s] clearly and directly to impose different treatment on gay individuals
because of their sexual orientation.” Id. at 431 n.24.
372
It is centrally relevant that gay persons are “a minority group that continues to suffer the
enduring effects of centuries of legally sanctioned discrimination . . . .” Id. at 432. But it is not quite
accurate to say that “laws singling [gay persons] out for disparate treatment are subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny to ensure that those laws are not the product of such historical prejudice and
stereotyping.” Id. This is a vestigial intent theory reemerging. Here, the court seems to think that it
should be looking to what produced the law, rather than to what kind of effects the law is likely to
produce, based on social fact and cultural meaning.
373
“At this point in our state’s history . . . and without appropriate fact-finding on the issue, I am
unable to say that [civil union] is widely considered to be less than or inferior to marriage, or that it
does not bring with it the same social recognition as marriage. It is simply too early to know this with
any reasonable measure of certitude.” Id. at 486 (Borden, J., dissenting).
374
See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 446 (Cal. 2008) (discussing an additional
privacy harm in forcing disclosure of same-sex couple status, without linking this harm to the opinion’s
underlying analysis of constitutional injury).
375
To be sure, in contrast to public records of marriages, we do not maintain an official register of
who is gay or lesbian. But there is widespread disclosure where same-sex couples are concerned.
Inevitably, various visible or linguistic markers for those in a same-sex relationship make likely
homosexuality evident, regardless of whether a speaker ever uses the terms “civil union” or “marriage.”
These might include the visible presence of a same-sex partner, or a pronoun reference to “he” or
“she,” or other indicators such as photographs or clothing, which will disclose same-sex couple status
and thus allow others to infer homosexuality. See generally Fajer, supra note 311; Poirier,
Microperformances of Identity, supra note 271, at 14–15 (discussing the way in which visible same-sex
couples communicate identity traits around sex, gender, and sexual orientation and disrupt normal
performances of these categories).
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legitimate in everyday life the distinction between married and unmarried
women, as well as problematic cognitive associations related to that
distinction. The “Miss”/“Mrs.” distinction reproduces a sorting and
labeling of women.
Consider the alternatives that a legislature must address when it
reaches the point of deciding to legally recognize same-sex couples. If a
state eschews “civil union” or some other word, and uses “marriage” and
its cognates in a way that encompasses same-sex couples, that will not
immediately change most of everyday practice. On various social levels
many people and civic institutions (some churches, for example) will still
withhold the name marriage. Moreover, given that same-sex couples will
still be visible as same-sex couples in everyday life (and identifiable
audibly/linguistically too, as soon as a same-gender pronoun is used), the
inference of homosexuality will still occur in many circumstances even if
the legal relationship is called “marriage.”376 But if the name “marriage”
also applies to same-sex couples, inquiring into same-sex/different sex and
speaking differentially in light of that fact will not be legally required. On
a social level, if the different name “civil union” is not authorized, the
name “marriage” for same-sex unions is likely to gain hold significantly
more quickly in common parlance. Even though resistance to it is likely to
persist for a long time (especially given the fierce adherence of some
traditionalists and civic institutions to a particular conception of
“marriage”), naming practices will tend to change faster overall. Also, the
intangible harm of social non-recognition (an intangible harm which I have
not addressed in this Article) is likely to be addressed more quickly where
a new term “civil union” does not stand in the way of changing the
everyday usages of “marriage” to include legally recognized same-sex
couples.
And that in turn may facilitate more widespread legal
recognition, as a matter of interstate comity or eventually in formal change
at higher levels of government.
C. Constitutional Injury through Exclusion When the Government
Recognizes One Group with Special Honor
So far, I have focused on the fact that the differential naming approach
will result in categorization, which will which cause individuals to
associate “civil union” with “gay or lesbian” and whatever else that may be
376
In fact, that is one reason why I think that allowing same-sex couples to marry probably will,
in the long run, alter the gendered nature of traditional marriage. The everyday microperformances of
married status by same-gender couples will consistently trouble the diffuse expectation that a
prototypical married couple will be opposite gender. Compare Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and
Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9, 18–19 (1991) (arguing that gay and lesbian
marriage will alter the gendered structure of marriage), with Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We
Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of
Gender in Every Marriage”, 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536–37 (1993) (disagreeing with Hunter).
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associated with in each individual’s cognitive structures. The other half of
the equation in the Kerrigan opinion is the fact that “marriage,” in all its
splendor, has a long and honored history. Calling a same-sex couple’s
relationship by the name “civil union” withholds that traditionally honored
and recognized status from those couples and their families. Is this a
separate kind of stigmatic injury, and if so, is it of constitutional
dimension? Thomas Healy discerns, among the indicia of standing for
stigmatic injury in federal court cases, that this kind of honor/no
recognition pair has been understood to be of constitutional dimension, in
particular in the subset of Establishment Clause cases involving religious
displays.377 But what, after all, is the harm in honoring one religion’s
tradition in a public display, and not another religion’s tradition in the
same way?
In her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, a religious display case
involving a Nativity crèche, Justice O’Connor wrote that governmentallysponsored religious displays would make nonadherents feel that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and would send a
message to adherents that they are insiders and favored members of the
community.378 We can generalize this principle of non-endorsement, and
see the underlying structure of such an injury in governmental action that
gives special recognition to one group and not to another, particularly in
centrally important and status-conferring social categories.379 The injury
concerns the use of what Kenneth Karst calls “symbols of inclusion and
exclusion.”380 The religious display cases involve one basic identity
category—religion—and hold that the government may not endorse one
religion and withhold endorsement from another.381 Arguably, the
identification as a legitimate family is equally central to social status, and
the elevation of different-sex families and implicit lesser status of same-sex
families in that arena is an injury of the same kind. As Karst writes, “the
government’s message of exclusion is itself a stigmatic harm, and an
377

Healy, supra note 35, at 436–38.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (involving the
display of a Nativity scene by the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island). Justice O’Connor reiterated this
analysis the following term in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(involving a “moment of silence” in public schools). This endorsement test was essentially adopted by
a majority of justices in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595–99 (1989) (applying to
public displays of a crèche and of a menorah next to a Christmas tree the endorsement test from
O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch); id. at 623–32 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (articulating and applying
the endorsement test from her Lynch concurrence).
379
Jack Balkin observes that Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement” test is about status categories; it
“prohibit[s] certain government actions that raise the status of some social groups at the expense of
others.” Balkin, supra note 247, at 2349 n.109. Balkin also notes that the injury here is a
communication by the state of inferior group status, and bears a close relationship to Charles
Lawrence’s argument about “cultural meaning”. Id. (discussing the O’Connor endorsement test in light
of Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, supra note 131).
380
Karst, The First Amendment, supra note 38, at 512, 519.
381
Id. at 512.
378
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unconstitutional denial of full membership in the community.”
In the
one instance, the problem is displaying a religious symbol, which conveys
honor to one group above others. In the other, the problem is reserving the
name marriage for opposite-sex couples, which effectively conveys the
honored status of marriage on one group above the other. In its analysis of
the difference between “marriage” and “civil union,” the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court specifically called it a “stigma of exclusion.”383
Professor Karst has developed this idea of the stigmatic injury of
symbolic exclusion into a broad theory of equal citizenship and belonging
rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment.384 He describes the principle of equal
citizenship as follows:
Each individual is presumptively entitled to be treated by the
organized society as a respected, responsible, and
participating member. Stated negatively, the principle forbids
the organized society to treat an individual as a member of an
inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant. The
principle thus centers on those aspects of equality that are
most closely bound to the sense of self and the sense of

382

Karst, Justice O’Connor, supra note 37, at 371.
This type of injury has also come to be known as “expressive harm”. See, e.g., Rachel D. Godsil,
Expressivism, Empathy, and Equality, 36 MICH. J. L. REF. 247, 252–53, 254–75 (2003) (tracing the
doctrinal and theoretical history from early stigma cases, through reliance on intent, through the
reemergence of stigma and expressive harm tests and theories). In a major theoretical article on
expressive harm, Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes argue that Equal Protection and Establishment
Clause cases are the most often discussed bases for a constitutional theory of expressive harm.
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1532 (2000). Equal Protection may be concerned with the expression of
“contempt, hostility, or inappropriate paternalism towards racial, ethnic, gender, and certain other
classifications, or that constitute them as social inferiors or as a stigmatized pariah class.” Id. at 1533.
But it may also address inappropriate recognition—“laws that, by giving too much weight to a suspect
class, express a divisive conception of citizens—a conception that represents their racial, ethnic,
religious, or other parochial identities as more important than their common identity as citizens of the
United States.” Id. at 1533–34. Moreover, while there are multiple functions to Establishment Clause
doctrine, Anderson and Pildes conclude that “[e]xpressivist analysis properly dominates the parts of
Establishment doctrine that perform the same function for religious differences among citizens that
Equal Protection doctrine performs for racial and ethnic differences among citizens.” Id. at 1550.
383
The court writes: “The bill would have the effect of maintaining and fostering a stigma of
exclusion that the Constitution prohibits. It would deny to same-sex spouses only a status that is
specially recognized in society and has significant social and other advantages.” In re Opinions of the
Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004).
384
See, e.g., KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 36; Karst, Why Equality Matters, supra
note 346; Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship, supra note 36; see also Balkin, supra note 247, at 2343–
44 (arguing that “[t]he constitution has an egalitarian demand . . . for equality of social status. . . that
exists even though it cannot be achieved by legal means alone[,]” and that this demand is “the deep
meaning of the American political experience.”); Poirier, Gender, Place, supra note 271, at 336–39
(discussing the notion of equal citizenship in the context of a tiered account of the praxis of exclusion
and inclusion, with specific incidents of exclusion at the bottom level, broad concepts of inclusion and
citizenship at the top, and specific legal doctrines of various sorts mediating between them).

1492

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

inclusion in a community.

[Vol. 41:1425

385

The school desegregation cases and public accommodation desegregation
cases were about claims to equal citizenship, Karst asserts.386 But “neither
the [Fourteenth A]mendment’s declaration of citizenship nor its equal
protection clause is limited to the subject of race.”387 “It was the claim of
equal citizenship that informed the first manifesto to issue from the
American women’s movement . . . .”388 Karst also argues that Bowers v.
Hardwick should have approached the issue of the constitutionality of
sodomy laws as one of stigma and exclusion.389 One of the five
“illustrative cases” Karst uses to introduce his idea of equal citizenship as
belonging is, precisely, the crèche display in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, that
was the subject of Lynch v. Donnelly.390
The “endorsement” test from the religious display cases is helpful in
elucidating the status harm in the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction. For
these cases depend entirely on whether the state has acted to elevate one
group, and not at all on whether the state has acted to disparage another
group. As Jack Balkin points out, “the test does not require any deliberate
attempt to degrade or harm; the mere effect of endorsement as judged by a
reasonable observer is sufficient.”391 Justice Borden’s concern in his
Kerrigan dissent about what “civil union” means simple drops out as part
of the analysis. The Civil Union Act grants the honored name, status, and
385
KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 36, at 3. In this broad reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Karst expressly disagrees with the central cases of the second half of the nineteenth
century which limited the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 57–61. Jack Balkin, making a
parallel argument about a broad concept of equal citizenship, relies on a number of “statusdisestablishing clauses” in the constitution. Balkin, supra note 247, at 2346–53.
Anderson & Pildes identify the same broad underlying issues of citizen respect, participation, and
membership as Karst does. Under the principle of expressive harm, “State action must express ‘equal
concern and respect’ for all persons. . . .” Anderson & Pildes, supra note 382, at 1520 (quoting
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977)). And state action “must express a
collective understanding of all citizens as equal members of the State . . . notwithstanding their racial,
ethnic, or religious differences.” Id.
386
KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 36, at 4. Brown v. Board of Education, 374 U.S.
483 (1954), is a “leitmotif” in Karst’s book. Id. at 14. Brown v. Board depended on identifying the
harm of a sense of inferiority created by state-sponsored exclusion, and Karst asserts that within a few
years this case became the key citation for this principle, although often without explanation. Id. at 18–
19. Indeed, Karst describes instances of segregation as effectively “degradation ceremonies.” Id. at 4
(referring to Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J.
SOCIOLOGY 420 (1956)).
387
Id. at 4.
388
Id. at 111 (discussing the Declaration of Sentiments adopted in Seneca Falls, New York, in
1848).
389
Id. at 204–06 (discussing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled, Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). In addition to criminalization of sodomy, Karst identifies the other
principal form of exclusion from citizenship of gays and lesbians as the issue of military service and
security clearance. Id. at 208. Karst was writing before the political developments of the 1990s opened
up the possibility of same-sex couple and family recognition and made the longstanding practices of
exclusion in those areas widely visible and contestable.
390
Id. at 8–9 (discussing Lynch v. Donnelly, 468 U.S. 668 (1984)).
391
Balkin, supra note 247, at 2349 n.109.
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kinship of “marriage” to some legally-recognized couples but not to all of
them. To be sure, what constitutes an endorsement, as opposed to say an
instructive historical display, is the subject of ongoing controversy and
sometimes fine distinctions.392 But in the case of a legislature reserving
“marriage” for opposite-sex couples, the intentional elevation of these
couples through use of the name “marriage” and the simultaneous
exclusion of same-sex couples from similar honor through the use of some
other name, couldn’t be clearer. Karst offers a theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment that elaborates from our country’s cultural underpinnings as
well as case law, in just the way Robert Leckey recommends.393 It
expresses well a set of constitutional values that focus on equal citizenship
and belonging. The Connecticut Supreme Court, interpreting the state
constitution, can be understood to apply the same touchstone of
constitutional principle to the elevation of one group but not another.
V. RECAPITULATION: NAME CALLING AND IDENTIFYING STIGMA
The title of this Article is deliberately ambiguous, in fact doubly so. It
relies on ambiguities in English grammar around verb forms ending in
“ing.” “Name calling” could be about someone calling out bad names—in
this case, possibly, the implicit stigma associated with the Connecticut
legislature’s refusal to use the word “marriage” officially for same-sex
couples, prescribing “civil union” instead. “Civil union” does not
explicitly insult same sex couples, to be sure. But the Civil Union Act
deliberately withholds the unique name “marriage,” which confers favored
identity, normal status, and easily recognized kinship forms. This
withholding could be understood as an insult from the legislature, albeit a
discreet one.
“Name calling” is also potentially a shorthand for the phenomenon of
Against a background of a history of stigma,
interpellation.394
discrimination, and second-class (or worse) treatment of gay and lesbian
folk, the withholding of “marriage” and its replacement by a neologism—
“civil union”—facilitate the continued interpellation of gay and lesbian
couples, their families and, in a different way, all those who must interact
392
Compare McCreary County, Ky. v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S.
844 (2005) (finding display of Ten Commandments at county courthouses, as part of a larger display,
to be an unconstitutional establishment of religion, in light of past history of the county’s attempts to
display Ten Commandments, which indicated a religious purpose to the display), with Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (finding display of Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds
not to be an establishment of religion). As Balkin points out, the endorsement test, like Charles
Lawrence’s cultural meaning test, requires courts “to investigate the cultural meaning of government
action to determine if an injury to status has occurred;” disagreements will be inevitable. Balkin, supra
note 247, at 2349 n.109.
393
Leckey, supra note 14, at 465–74.
394
See supra Part III.B (discussing Althusser’s theory of interpellation and its relation to namecalling).
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with them as couples. This interpellation occurs because of preexisting,
stigmatizing practices and names, which persist to some considerable
extent in Connecticut—the territorial jurisdiction at issue—as well as in
wider society. Because “marriage” has a tradition, history, and culture,
and “civil union” does not, the diffuse social practices around identifying
and stigmatizing gays and lesbians (singly and as couples) are allowed
more room to perpetuate themselves than if legal same-sex unions had
been formally legally labeled “marriage.” “Civil union” is effectively a
blank slate, and in the absence of a name that will call up our inherited
associations to “marriage” for same-sex couples—and only “marriage” will
do that—we are able to hear other names, other insults, still calling.
“Identifying stigma” in the Article’s title is also ambiguous. The
Article agrees with and expands upon what the Connecticut Supreme Court
majority did: it identified stigma lurking behind the neologism “civil
union.” Justice Borden, arguing in dissent that a word without history
could not be an insult, is just wrong, though other judges have said the
same. The Kerrigan majority was justified here by relying on obvious
cultural meaning and social fact to recognize the persistent vestiges of a
longstanding practice of subordination and prejudice.
This Article has suggested that the reason the court is able to identify
stigma in “civil union” is precisely because the distinction will evoke
stigma in the process of everyday identifications—the repeated naming--of
a fundamental kinship form. The “civil union”/“marriage” distinction
forces or encourages everyone, across a wide spectrum of interpersonal
interactions, to engage in repeated acts of cognitively identifying same-sex
couples as distinct from married different-sex couples.
In these
interactions, traditional stigmatization and second-class (or worse) views
of homosexuals will inevitably come to mind. These may or may not be
reenacted in any given instance, but they will be recalled, often
unconsciously, and sometimes they will be reenacted. Requiring same-sex
couples to be named differently thus tends to perpetuate some of the
historical practice of stigmatizing them. The Act’s purported guarantee of
equal treatment legally is well and good, but it simply fails to come to
terms with the everyday social and cultural practices and the cognitive
mechanisms underlying them, in which names for kinship categories are
applied and identities are recognized and (re)produced. Requiring a
different name for same-sex couples produces an identifying stigma.

